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It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes'
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article takes a critical look at the persistence of legal
doctrines that prohibit or limit property rights in litigation. The
Article focuses on prohibitions on assignment and maintenance.
Assignment of personal injury tort claims is prohibited throughout the
United States, while the assignment of other claims, such as fraud
and professional malpractice, is prohibited in a large number of states.
Maintenance, in which a stranger provides something of value to a
litigant in order to support or promote the litigation, is prohibited in
2
varying degrees in the United States.
These doctrines might seem quite independent of each other at
first glance, but as I will demonstrate below, their persistence in U.S.
law is due to their reliance on a common conceptual claim about the
very nature of law. This claim asserts first, that there is a quality,
separate from and in addition to legal validity, which confers
"authenticity" to a lawsuit, and second, that a lawsuit which fails to be
"authentic" cannot be recognized by a court, regardless of the positive
social consequences of allowing such suits. 3 The claim does not
presuppose that "inauthentic" lawsuits are more likely to be spurious,

1.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
2.
See infra Part III.
3.
This is, in effect, the argument of the United States Chamber of Commerce against the
expansion of a market in lawsuits in the U.S. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES

4 (2009) [hereinafter SELLING LAWSUITS] (discussing that although practices like third-party
litigation financing increase plaintiffs access to the courts, they also "increase the overall
litigation volume, including the number of nonmeritorious cases filed, and thus effectively reduce
(not increase) the level of justice in the litigation system').
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fraudulent, or frivolous. What distinguishes the theory of the
inauthentic claim from more familiar theories about the conditions
which lead to fraudulent lawsuits is that it asserts that a court cannot
even hear a suit based on allegations known to be true and legal
theories known to be valid because actions taken by the claimant
corrupted or polluted the claim.4 While there might be some version of
a complex consequentialist argument behind the assumption that
"inauthentic claims" must be prohibited, or, at the very least, limited,
this Article will leave it for others to develop that argument. 5 I will,
instead, take seriously those who believe that inauthentic claims are,
as a matter of history or principle, inconsistent with the common law's
6
values and traditions.
A. The Lawsuit as Property
The law permits ownership in ways that are more sophisticated
and complex than in the past. Sometimes the sophistication of our
legal and economic theories outstrips our common sense, as the recent
experience with the securitization of subprime mortgages tends to
demonstrate. 7 But in general, the history of property theory over the
past century has been a story of increasing complexity bringing
increasing opportunity and wealth creation.8 It seems unlikely that

Concerns over inauthentic claims are therefore distinguishable from concerns over
4.
fraudulent claims brought by unscrupulous attorneys in the mass litigation context. See Roger
Parloff, Diagnosingfor Dollars, FORTUNE, June 13, 2005, at 96 (noting that the federal court
silica litigation raised "great red flags of fraud"). See generally Lester Brickman, Disparities
Between Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings and ClinicalStudies,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 513 (2007) (describing problems with litigation screenings); Lester
Brickman, On the Applicability of the Silica MDL Proceeding to Asbestos Litigation, 12 CONN.
INS. L.J. 289 (2006) (same); Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A
Formula for Fraud?,61 SMU L. REV. 1221 (2008) (same).
The theory of the inauthentic claim parallels the equitable defense of "unclean hands." See 1
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(2) (2d ed. 1993) (discussing how the unclean hands
defense is closely related to other equitable defenses and equitable concerns over hardship,
because any conduct the chancellor may consider to be unethical or improper might suffice to bar
the plaintiffs claim, even if the conduct is not actually illegal). The difference is that, whereas
unclean hands focuses on actions taken before a claim ripened into legal sufficiency, the theory of
the inauthentic claim targets actions taken after a claim has ripened into legal sufficiency.
See infra Part V, which provides a quick tour of the reasons why I think
5.
consequentialist arguments against the commodification of lawsuits lack empirical support.
See infra Part IV.
6.
Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts,94
7.
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1126-28 (2009).
Jeremy Adelman, Property Rules or the Rule of Property? Carol Rose on the History,
8.
Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1041, 1041-43 (1996).
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even the critics of today's "hyper-market" society would like to return
to an era when land could not be divided into interests or used to
secure mortgages, or firms could not be sold off as shares in
corporations with limited rights and obligations, or debt obligations
could not be transferred from the original obligor to another party
whom the debtor never met. 9 Often each new form of property is
created by someone looking to take advantage of a previously unseen
and unexploited market opportunity. Typically innovations in
property are permitted to the extent that they do not induce fraud.
Sometimes after the fact they are subject to regulation if their benefits
are outweighed by their costs, economic or social.
Notwithstanding the feeling that sometimes we live in a hypermarket where everything and anything can be bought and sold, there
persist limitations on what can be turned into property, or more
properly, what forms of property the law will respect by enforcing
through injunction and/or money judgment the right to exclude and
transfer that is inherent in property.10 Most famous are examples of
limitations on ownership and exchanges in which the body is treated
as chattel: voluntary slavery, or the sale of one's own organs or
reproductive capabilities (surrogacy).11 The law is replete with such
restrictions, although sometimes the limitations are conceptualized
under the rubric of the regulation of conduct and not the prohibition of
a form of property. One could describe laws that prohibit the
possession of a controlled substance (for example, drugs or alcohol) as
a prohibition of property rights in those things.1 2 Or one could describe

0. Lee Reed, What is ' Property'?,41 AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 471 n.38 (2004).
9.
10. Felix Cohen offers the following analysis summarizing the relationship between the
individual and the state regarding property rights:
mhat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private Citizen
Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogueon Private Property,9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954).
11. See, e.g., William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize
Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFsTRA L. REV. 693, 713 (1995) (discussing federal
and state prohibition on the sale of human organs).
12. Barclay Thomas Johnson, Restoring Civility-The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 104849 (2002).
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laws that prohibit prostitution as a prohibition of property rights in
13
one's own sexual capacities.
The wisdom of the prohibitions on property in the body have
been debated, but the tenor of that debate seems quite different from
debates over whether to prohibit credit-default swaps or subprime
mortgages, to take just two recent controversial examples. 14 When
people argue over whether to permit a market in surrogacy or organs,
the debate sometimes turns on consequentialist arguments (for
example, whether such markets exploit the poor), but it often turns on
conceptual arguments about the limits of commodification, human
dignity, and the ethics of markets. 15 Debates about the prohibition of
most other market innovations are typically conducted on just the
consequentialist level. Should credit-default swaps be prohibited (or
limited)? The answer depends on the estimates that can be reasonably
made today as to the likely effect of permitting a market in these
instruments that treats them as property, as opposed to, for example,
an insurance contract. 16 Should subprime mortgages be prohibited (or
limited)? The answer lies in the predictions experts offer as to the
likely effect of permitting a market in these instruments compared to
7
the effect of pricing higher risk borrowers out of the housing market.
Sometimes debates over certain property rights will take on moral
dimensions, especially in the area of land-use regulation,' 8 but even in
the area of consumer credit, where limitations on exchanges of money
were once justified under religiously rooted doctrines of usury, the
active debate over whether to permit a market in loans for consumers
without any limitations on the absolute rate of interest is conducted
on a consequentialist basis. The questions typically asked by
legislatures when debating laws to limit "usurious" lending concern its
effect on the poor and less-educated, and, by extension, whether the
limits cost society overall more than would be gained by allowing

13. Robert W. McGee, Essay: Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Property Rights
and ImmigrationPolicy, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 506 (1994).
14. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, 'To Be Human" A Psychological Perspective on Property Law,
83 TuL.L. REV. 609, 610-21, 633-35 (2009); Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime
Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 642-44 (2008).
15. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, PersonalizingPersonalty:Toward a PropertyRight in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 212-20, 239-43 (1990).
16. Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps,
Insuranceand a Theory of Demarcation,12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 181-200 (2007).
17. John A.E. Pottow, PrivateLiability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
405, 446-51.
18. Kimberly M. Watt, Eminent Domain, Regulatory Takings, and Legislative Responses in
the Post-Kelo Northwest, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 558-72 (2007).
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lenders to make any deal they wish with fully informed, freely
choosing borrowers. 19
In other words, restrictions on property in U.S. law can be
characterized as follows. First, the historical trend has been to have
fewer restrictions. Second, where restrictions persist or are adopted,
the rule has been that they are justified on consequentialist grounds.
The exception to the rule is that they may be justified on conceptual or
moral grounds, often having to do with a deeply felt revulsion at the
commodification of the human body. These two principles fit well with
the United States' historical commitment to markets and pragmatism
when it comes to law (private law, at least).
The exception to this general approach to commodification in
20
law is U.S. law's resistance to allowing property rights in lawsuits.
My review of the history of the common law reveals that a party may
"inauthenticate" a legally sufficient claim in one of two ways: either by
(1) impermissibly transferring the claim to a third party (assignment)
or (2) receiving improper aid from a stranger to the case
(maintenance). This Article brings these two prohibitions under a
single moniker in order to illuminate and challenge the common
prejudice that motivates them. Because limitations on assignment
have been lifted in vast areas of the private law in the last century,
modern lawyers have tended to stop thinking about it. This, I believe,
is a mistake. Although limitations on assignment have been greatly
reduced, the theory of the inauthentic claim still casts a long shadow
over the common law, both in the area of assignment and especially in
the area of maintenance, where limitations sweep far more broadly
across the different departments of the common law.
In this Article, I will demonstrate that the theory of the
inauthentic claim depends on an incoherent and indefensible
a claim that arises "naturally" (for example, on its
dichotomy between
"own bottom" 21), and a claim that arises "unnaturally." The theory of
the inauthentic claim relies on this dichotomy to explain why courts
dismiss certain claims when the person who is "really" bringing the

19. Diane HeUwig, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's Clothing: Why Re-regulating the
Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1574-80, 1600-

10 (2005).
20. This is not a new observation. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in
Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816, 816-21 (1916), and Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24
CAL. L. REV. 48, 71-72 (1936), for a criticism of restrictions on assignment and maintenance by
the Legal Realists in the early twentieth century.
21. See Walis v. Duke of Portland, (1797) 30 Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ch.) 1128; 3 Ves. Jun. 494,
502. This expression will be discussed in more detail infra Section III.B.4.
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claim is not the person who suffered the wrong for which the redress is
sought. This idea has its roots in the commonplace corrective justice
insight that a wrong creates an obligation on the part of the
wrongdoer to repair. 22 I believe, however, that it is a mistake to read
into corrective justice an essential hostility to the free alienability of
lawsuits.
The theory of the inauthentic claim, and the putative corrective
justice rationale behind it, has not been clearly identified before,
although both the assignment of lawsuits and maintenance have been
studied and debated by lawyers, judges, and scholars over the past
two centuries. In this Article, I will argue that there is a theory of the
inauthentic claim embedded into the common law, that it relies on a
mistaken interpretation of corrective justice, and that if it is
abandoned, there would be no a priori reason, rooted in either
corrective justice or public policy, to oppose assignment or
maintenance.
B. An Example: MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels
The 1998 Virginia Supreme Court case MNC Credit Corp. v.
23
Sickels involved the assignment of a legal malpractice claim.
Defendant attorneys drafted documents for their client, a subsidiary
corporation, involving the return of a residential development cash
bond posted by the subsidiary. The entire cash bond was not returned
to the subsidiary, it seems, due to a mistake the lawyers made in
drafting the documents. The subsidiary assigned all its interests,
rights, and obligations to its parent. The parent corporation filed suit
against the defendant law firm alleging that it committed legal
malpractice in drafting the documents for the subsidiary. The Virginia
Supreme Court held that under Virginia common law, legal
malpractice claims and legal services contracts are not assignable.
The Court based its decision, in part, on the need to preserve
the unique relationship between lawyer and client, and this Article
will not discuss that part of its decision. 24 The section of the decision

22. See infra Section IV.B.
23. MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickles, 497 S.E.2d 331, 332 (Va. 1998).
24. Id. at 333-34. I briefly address the argument that the assignment of tort suits between
clients and their attorneys are especially dangerous below. See infra text accompanying note 29.
This argument uses the attorney-cient relationship as a device to limit the client's rights after
that relationship has been allegedly violated by the attorney. For this reason, many courts have
rejected the position adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court. See infra note 103.
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which illustrates the concept of the inauthentic claim is contained in a
long paragraph quoted from a 1976 California case:
The assignment of such claims could relegate the legal malpractice action to the market
place and convert it to a commodity to be exploited and transferred to economic bidders
who have never had a professional relationship with the attorney and to whom the
attorney has never owed a legal duty, and who have never had any prior connection
with the assignor or his rights ....
The almost certain end result of merchandizing such
causes of action is the lucrative business of factoring malpractice claims which would
encourage unjustified lawsuits against members of the legal profession, generate an
increase in legal malpractice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to
defend themselves against strangers. The endless complications and litigious intricacies
arising out of such commercial activities would place an undue burden on not only the
legal profession but the already overburdened judicial system .... 25

First, the court suspected that the assignment of legal
malpractice claims would promote "unjustified" claims. If by
"unjustified" the court meant carelessly researched or drafted, it is not
clear why this would be the case, since purchasers of lawsuits would
be expected to be especially careful at selecting only the strongest
claims. 26 Second, the court suspected that the assignment of legal
malpractice claims would produce an increase in such claims. Even if
this were true, why would this be a bad thing? If the malpractice
claims that would be assigned were not fraudulent and reflected
claims based on valid law, why would it be a bad thing for these cases
to increase in number, since that would mean that more legal wrongs
would be repaired and more wrongdoers held to account? 27 Third, the
court suspected that the assignment of legal malpractice claims would
encourage champerty, which is a species of maintenance. Strictly
speaking, champerty occurs where a stranger offers to support a
party's litigation costs in exchange for a payment contingent on the
outcome of the case. 28 The court could not have meant champerty in
its literal form, since an assignment puts the third party in the shoes
of the party who originally had the right to bring the lawsuit, but I
think that a fair reading of the Virginia Supreme Court's language

25. Id. at 333-34 (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App.
1976)).
26. The degree to which investors can choose relatively stronger cases depends, in part, on
their willingness to invest early in search costs. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND

UNKNOWNS 24 (2010) (discussing how due diligence processes will reduce costs associated with
adverse selection and moral hazard).
27. N.H. Ins. Co. v. McCann, 707 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Mass. 1999); Kevin Pennell, Note, On the
Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims: A Contractual Solution to a Contractual Problem, 82
TEX. L. REV. 481, 494, 496 (2003).
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
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reflects its larger concern with the idea that strangers to a lawsuit
should not profit off of a lawsuit's resolution. Why this should be a
cause for concern is one of the subjects of this Article.
Fourth, the court suspected that the assignment of legal
malpractice claims would force attorneys to "defend themselves
against strangers." 29 The motivation behind this worry is unclear. By
definition, an assignment puts a third party in the shoes of the
assignor. An assignment of a contract claim alleging that a builder
failed to perform satisfactorily puts the defendant builder in the
position of having to defend against a stranger. It is unclear why the
concern raised by the court does not cut against the assignment of all
contracts, a practice that had been accepted throughout the same
period of time when the assignment of tort claims (especially claims
deemed "personal" to the claimant) were prohibited.30 Why exactly
this distinction was drawn is another subject of this Article.
Fifth, the court suspected that the assignment of legal
malpractice claims would mean an increase in such claims that may
create a burden on the court system. This is a nuanced version of the
second argument above. Again, it is not clear why an increase in the
workload of the court system is an argument against assignment if the
claims were not fraudulent and reflected a set of wrongs that we
would otherwise qualify for redress in the tort system. The
consequence of increased caseloads might force society to consider an
increase in resources devoted to civil justice, or resources devoted to
reducing the injury-producing activity, or, if neither of those were
possible, to consider a rational and fair system to ration judicial
resources among all parties with civil suits (leading, inevitably, to the
adoption of non-litigation compensation systems). 31 Unless there is an
29. MNC Credit Corp., 497 S.E.2d at 333.
30. Furthermore, although the party in interest may be a "stranger," the claim is not that of
a stranger's. The claim is grounded in the injury suffered by the person with whom the
defendant had the original relationship that gave rise to the claim for redress. So the lawsuit
does not require the defendant to encounter anything alien or strange.
31. The portion of social resources dedicated to the resolution of legal claims can vary
tremendously even among liberal democracies, and are the result (in part) of collective decisions
about judicial resources, legal aid, and indirect methods of funding civil litigation (e.g., the
contingency fee or legal insurance). See Erhard Blankenburg, Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators
for Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES, 41 (David Nelken ed., Dartmouth 1996);
Erhard Blankenburg, The Infrastructure for Avoiding Civil Litigation: Comparing Cultures of
Legal Behavior in the Netherlands and West Germany, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 789 (1994)
(discussing how the absence or presence of institutions at the pretrial stage filtering disputes
explains the difference in litigation frequency between the Netherlands and West Germany);
Erhard Blankenburg, Studying the Frequency of Civil Litigation in Germany, 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 307, 310-18 (1975) (exploring the potential ecological, economic, and social factors

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1:61

independent reason to treat tort suits that have been assigned with a
hostility not shown to other tort suits, or other suits in general, the
fifth argument is specious.
There seem to be five arguments contained in this passage. I
think the most interesting arguments are (3) and (4): the common law
prohibition against certain forms of maintenance (for example,
champerty) and the argument that the civil justice system should only
concern itself with claims that are brought "personally"-that is, that
are brought by the person actually harmed. These two arguments, I
will argue below, are really one and the same. Aside from certain
consequentialist grounds for the prohibition against champerty, which
were based on empirical conditions that even the courts that uphold
the prohibition today admit are anachronistic, the prohibition of
champerty is rooted in a claim about what is necessary and essential
in a lawsuit in tort or contract. According to this argument, there is
something special about these suits such that a stranger to the
accident may not possess any form of property interest in the claim for
legal redress generated by the accident, and the burden of proof for
any deviation from this principle lay with the party seeking to create
this new form of property.
In this Article, I will argue that the concern over the possibility
that a stranger to an accident may be the "true" force behind a lawsuit
which brings a wrongdoer into the civil justice system is an expression
of the principle of the inauthentic claim. This Article, therefore, will
try to explain the attractiveness of decisions like MNC Credit Corp. by
examining the history of the concept of the inauthentic claim and the
content of the concept. I recognize, of course, that the concept may
lack rational content, or might be based on ideals and concerns that
were relevant and persuasive at one point in the history of the
common law but not today. Still, as Holmes said, you have to pull the
dragon out of its cave in order to kill it.32 This is an exercise in
dragging.
This Article has five parts. Part I is the Introduction. Part II
reviews the current state of the law of assignment, which involves a

influencing the difference in litigation rates between urban and rural districts in Western
Germany). Of course, at some point a society may decide that adversarial legal methods for
evaluating claims are simply not worth the cost, and move to various forms of social insurance or
strict liability. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1084 (1972) (noting that the strict liability approach is more likely than

either the classical negligence calculus and its mirror image to accomplish "a minimization of the
sum of accident costs and of accident avoidance costs").

32.

Holmes, supranote 1.
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review of multiple jurisdictions' exceptions to the general principle
that choses in action are freely assignable. I provide a history of the
gradual liberalization of the rule against assignment, without which
the current state of the law would be incomprehensible. In Part III, I
review the current state of the legal doctrines that limit maintenance.
This will require a review of multiple jurisdictions' common law and
statutory material, producing a taxonomy of the patchwork of laws
concerning maintenance in the United States today. In Part IV, I
review arguments from history and jurisprudence in favor of the
theory of the inauthentic claim. I will argue that the idea that redress
in private law must mirror the relationship that gave rise to the
wrong misapplies the corrective justice theorist's insight that a
wrongdoer's obligation to repair is based on a relational wrong done to
the victim (and not, for example, to society at large). 33 In Part V, the
Conclusion, I will briefly consider the role of empirical research and
public policy concerns in the historical and contemporary debate over
the liberalization of the law of assignment and maintenance. It may be
the case that the liberalization of the rules concerning maintenance
would harm the civil litigation system, either because third parties
will exploit the original claimholders, or because it will increase the
number of meritless or socially inefficient lawsuits. 34 My treatment of
these policy arguments will be to take them at face value; that is, this
Article will not attempt to prove that there may be no good
consequentialist arguments to limit the property interests that
citizens can take in litigation. This Article will conclude merely that
any current restrictions on assignment and maintenance should be
based on empirical evidence that the social costs of any given class of
maintenance or assignment relationship outweigh their social
benefits.3 5 The Article will end by taking note of the existence of

33. See infra Section IV.B.
34. See, e.g., Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical
Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007) (discussing the "potentially dilatory" impact upon settlements
that litigation loan agreements have by forcing litigation and the potential victimization of
litigants by third parties with superior bargaining power when entering into such agreements);
Paul H. Rubin, Third Party Financing of Litigation (Third Party Financing of Litigation
Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Sept. 24-25, 2009), available at http://www.
law.northwestern.edu/jep/symposia/JEPcCJ-2009_Rubin.pdf (discussing the external costs of
allowing sale of legal claims including increased litigation costs and inefficient substantive law).
35. See GARBER, supra note 26, at 45 ("It is also wise to be skeptical of one-size-fits-all
policy responses ... [t]o different types of [markets in lawsuits] .... It seems implausible that
widely applicable policies will be widely effective in promoting social objectives.').

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1:61

commercial enterprises that are investing in litigation in Europe and
36
Australia, and will recommend further avenues for research.
C. Assignment and MaintenanceDefined
Modern commentary often blends together the legal doctrines
that place limits on assignment and maintenance. 37 It is important to
keep the two sets of limitations separate notwithstanding the fact that
fear of maintenance has always been the most common justification
for limitations on assignment. 38 If that justification were abandoned,
one could still have restrictions on maintenance in a world where
there were no limitations on assignment. This is, in fact, the very
state of affairs towards which U.S. law has been moving over the past
century.
An assignment is the act of transferring to another all or part
of one's property, interest, or rights. 39 While the early common law
rejected all assignments of a cause of action, regardless of whether it
was based in contract or tort, that restriction eventually shrank until
courts could state the modern rule was that "assignability of things [in
action] is now the rule; non-assignability, the exception; and this
exception is confined to wrongs done to the person, the reputation, or
The exceptions will be
."40
the feelings of the injured party .
described in this Section.
Maintenance is the "assistance in prosecuting or defending a
lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest in
the case [or] meddling in someone else's litigation."41 Champerty is a

36. My arguments do nothing more than establish the need for careful policy-based
research to draw boundaries and rules for a market in lawsuits. One recent publication that
takes up this challenge is Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract.id=1586053.
37.

EDMOND

H.

BODKIN,

THE

LAW OF MAINTENANCE

AND

CHAMPERTY

6-7

(1935)

("Inseparably bound up with the historical development of the law of maintenance, although
totally distinct from that law in origin, is the doctrine of the non-assignability of choses in
action.")
38. Id. at 7-8 ("[Maintenance was in fact assigned by the Courts as the reason for the nonassignability of choses in action.")
39. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (2010).
40. Webb v. Pillsbury, 144 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1943) (quoting 3 CAL. JUR. Assignments § 5
(1921)). In addition, most states will not permit the assignment of breach of contract claims that
are "purely personal in nature," such as promises of marriage. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 52
(2010).
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1039 (9th ed. 2009). Barratry is also a species of maintenance:
it is the practice of frequently exciting or stirring up suits in others. In other words, someone who
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species of maintenance. Champerty is "[a]n agreement between an
officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a litigant by which the
intermeddler helps pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for
receiving part of any judgment proceeds." 42 The chief difference
is that the maintainer is not
between maintenance and champerty 43
rewarded for his support of the litigant.
Although it is hard to imagine why someone might support
another's civil litigation except for profit, cases do occasionally arise in
the courts. For example, in Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., the
defendant was a law firm that had negligently prepared legal
documents for a third party. 44 The third party sued the plaintiff in a
related matter. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant offered to
finance the third party's suit-including the legal fees of another law
firm hired to prosecute the suit-in the hope that if the third party
received a settlement from the suit "he would not pursue a
malpractice claim against" the defendant. 45 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court agreed that, assuming the plaintiffs' allegations were
true, the plaintiff had stated an actionable claim for maintenance but
46
not champerty.
In the early twentieth century some courts interpreted the
prohibition on maintenance very broadly. In In the Matter of the
Estate of Gilman, Judge Cardozo said that "maintenance inspired by
charity or benevolence" could be legal but not "maintenance for spite
or envy or the promise or hope of gain."4 7 What Cardozo called
maintenance in case of "the promise of gain" is today simply called
champerty. 48 As we will see in Section III.B, some courts never took

engages in maintenance or champerty once has not committed barratry, but may nonetheless
have violated the prohibition on champerty or maintenance.
42. Id. at 262.
43. " '[P]ut simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is
maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing
practice of maintenance or champerty.'" Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273
(S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)).
44. 798 A.2d 901 (R.I. 2002).
45. Id. at 904.
46. Id. at 906. Note that the distinction between maintenance and champerty did not turn
on the law firm's motive in helping to fund the case brought by the third party (which was selfinterested) but on the absence of an agreement between the third party and the law firm to share
in the proceeds from the suit brought by the third party and paid for by the law firm.
47. 167 N.E. 437, 439 (N.Y. 1929).
48. Gilman involved maintenance by the party's own lawyer, which may have made it
especially obnoxious to Cardozo, although today such an arrangement-the contingency fee-is
the one form of maintenance that is universally accepted in every part of the United States. In
fact, the first efforts to loosen the limitations on champerty came out of the struggle to introduce
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the view that maintenance "inspired" by the promise of profit was
impermissible, while other courts came to move from Cardozo's
position towards a much more permissive position. 49 How this change
came about, and its relationship to the earlier loosening of limitations
on assignment across virtually the entire United States during the
nineteenth century, will take up most of the next Part.

II.

THE CURRENT LAW ON ASSIGNMENT

Today, the original common law rule of non-assignability has
been almost fully abandoned. 50 Exceptions do persist, however. The
leading test of assignability is whether or not the cause of action
survives the death of the plaintiff and can be taken up by his estate or
a representative appointed by law; if the cause of action survives, it is
51
assignable.
A. PersonalInjury
The most important current limitation, universally enforced
except in Texas, 52 and to a lesser extent Mississippi, 53 prohibits the

the contingency fee. See James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition,Thin Rationale: The "Acquisition
of an Interest and FinancialAssistance in Litigation"Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 229
(2003) (discussing how the contingent fee, "a particular form of 'maintenance by champerty,' "
arose in the United States); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of
Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 639-40 (1995) (discussing
how contingent fees were eventually excepted from the doctrine of champerty).
49. See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11 (Or. 1891).
50. See Osuna v. Albertson, 184 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345 (Ct. App. 1982) (discussing how "the
tendency of modern jurisprudence strongly favors the assignability and the survivability of
things in action'); McKenna v. Oliver, 159 P.3d 697, 699 (Colo. App. 2006) (discussing how
Colorado law generally favors the assignability of claims, with the exception being causes of
action for invasion of privacy); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa
2001) ("[Ihe law now generally favors the assignability of choses in action, and courts have
permitted the assignment of insurance policies under statutes providing for the assignment of
contracts in exchange for a money payment."); Lemley v. Pizzica, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 327, 330 (Ct.
Com. P1. 1964) ("The trend of judicial decisions as to the assignability of certain causes of action
is to enlarge, rather than to restrict the causes that may be assigned."); Wis. Bankers Ass'n v.
Mut. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Wis., 291 N.W.2d 869, 876 (Wis. 1980) (discussing how the principle of
assignability exemplifies a trend of increasing commercial flexibility, shared by the courts and
legislature).
51. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 49 (2010).
52. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987) ("[A] cause of action
for damages for personal injuries may be sold or assigned [in Texas].").
53. "By statute, Mississippi eventually changed the common law and held that '[a]ny chose
in action or any interest therein, after suit has been filed thereon, may be sold or assigned the
same as other property, whether such cause of action or any interest therein was heretofore
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assignment of causes of action for personal injuries.5 4 This is based on
the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona ("a
personal cause of action dies with the person").5 5 The enduring
influence of actio personalis today is hard to explain since the advent
of survivorship statutes in the nineteenth century essentially
suspended the common law doctrine; now tort claims survive the
death of the plaintiff and can be maintained by a set of persons named
in the statute, usually members of the plaintiffs family. 56
Survivorship laws posed a challenge to the historical limitation on the
assignment of personal injury claims: If they now survived, why
couldn't they be assigned? Almost all courts still refused to permit the
assignment of personal injury claims, but split on the reason for
maintaining the prohibition.5 7 Most states adopted what has been
called the "equivalency principle": the test of whether a cause of action
could be assigned was whether it survived in common law, that is,
prior to the passage of the survivorship statutes.5 8 The equivalency
principle treated actio personalis as evidence of a principle in the
common law that certain causes of action lacked some essential
quality which made their assignment impossible. 59 Other states

assignable under the laws of this state or not.'" Kaplan v. Harco Nat'l Ins. Co., 716 So. 2d 673,
676 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-7 (1972)).
54. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329,
330 (1987).
55. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 354 (2d ed. 2008). Actio personalis worked in both directions-

the death of the tortfeasor put an end to the plaintiffs suit also. As Blackstone put it, "neither
the [heirs of the deceased] plaintiff have received, nor those of the defendant have committed, in
their own personal capacity, any manner of wrong or injury." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *302.

56. In 1846 the English Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act, which created causes of
action for wrongful death and allowed designated representatives of the deceased plaintiff to
maintain the plaintiffs causes of action for personal injury; that is, it abrogated actio personalis.
The various states of the United States soon followed. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 357;
see, e.g., Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989) (describing operation of state survival
statute).
57. Patrick T. Morgan, Unbundling Our Tort Rights: Assignability for PersonalInjury and
Wrongful Death Claims, 66 MO. L. REV. 683, 689-90 (2001).
58. Shukaitis, supra note 54, at 331; Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible
Property:An Explorationfrom an Assignee's Perspective, 64 KY. L.J. 49, 69 (1975); see, e.g., In re
Schmelzer, 350 F. Supp. 429, 431 (S.D. Ohio 1972), affd, 480 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir. 1973)
("[Gloals of the Bankruptcy Act can hardly be achieved if the trustee is permitted to take over
the bankrupt's unliquidated claims for serious personal injuries.").
59. Weinberg, supra note 58, at 71.
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rejected the equivalency principle. 60 For these states, survivability
turned out to be only one policy factor to be weighed against other
policy factors. 61 If, after summing and weighing these factors, the
assignment of a cause of action named in a survival statute was
62
contrary to public policy, it would not be permitted.
Many states adopted the equivalency principle after the
American Revolution; the United States Supreme Court cited it
approvingly in 1828.63 The equivalency principle began to attract
criticism as well. 64 The chief problem with the principle was with the
"essential quality" allegedly lacking in causes of action which did not
survive in the common law. 65 Pomeroy said that the torts which
survived in common law (and thus were assignable even after the
passage of the survivorship laws) involved injury to real and personal
property and fraud or deceit; while those which did not survive at
common law, and thus were not assignable, were torts to the person or
character and which gave rise to only personal injury, emotional
distress, or loss of reputation unaccompanied by special damages. 66 In
both England and the United States, the missing quality had to do
with the target of the defendant's tortious act-torts causing injury to
property survived while torts causing injury to the person (the body,

60. See, e.g., Warner v. Flack, 278 Ill.
303, 309 (1917) ("[A]ssignability and heritability of
rights are not always, though usually, coexistent. Rights may pass by descent which cannot be
assigned.").
61. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Ark. 1970); Notarian v.
Plantation AMC Jeep, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Goldfarb v. Reicher,
171 A. 149, 150 (N.J. 1934); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Rader, 166 S.E.2d 157, 161 (W. Va. 1969).
62. See, e.g., Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 945 P.2d 317, 327 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1996); Town & Country Bank of Springfield v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Joos v. Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Wagener v.
McDonald, 509 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Can Do, Inc. v. Manier, 922 S.W.2d 865, 867
(Tenn. 1996).
63. Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. 193, 213 (1828) (noting in dictum: 'In general . . . mere
personal torts, which die with the party, and do not survive to his personal representative, are
not capable of assignment.").
64. See, e.g., McKee v. Judd, 12 N.Y. 622 (1855) (Hand, J., dissenting) (stating that if the
cause of action arises from an act that "diminishes or impairs" a person's property, it passes to
the assignees, and that the transfer in these cases complies with a statute and is generally in
invitum).
65. See Weinberg, supra note 58, at 73 (citing a difference in the treatment of voluntary
inter vivos assignments of personal tort claims and involuntary assignments to executors and
administrators).
66. 3 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1275 (3d ed. 1905);
Weinberg, supra note 58, at 69.
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feelings, or reputation) did not survive. As one court put it, looking
back on this doctrine:
Underlying the distinction between actions that die with the person and those that
survive is the basic thought that the reason for redressing purely personal wrongs
ceases to exist either when the person injured cannot be benefited by a recovery or the
person inflicting the injury cannot be punished, whereas, since the property or estate of
the injured person passes to his personal representatives, a cause of action for injury
67
done to these can achieve its purpose as well after the death of the owner as before.

Even if the boundary between injury to property and personal
injury could be maintained with any consistency in the context of
common law survivorship, 68 it was not clear why that boundary should
govern the rules of assignment. The obvious difference between the
two is that the original claimholder in a survivorship action is, by
definition, dead; but in assignment the original claimholder usually
outlives the lawsuit's transfer and resolution. In the case of
assignment, a person who suffered a wrong certainly could have been
"benefitted" by his assignee's recovery. The sale of the claim benefited
the assignor in the most direct and obvious way, and further, if he
participated in the litigation, he might have benefited by watching the
wrongdoer pay for the wrong, thus increasing his satisfaction
(especially if it turns out that the assignee is better able to pursue the
claim than the assignor). Yet, Weinberg noted, U.S. courts assumed
that "assignability flow[ed] naturally from survivability just as night
'69
inevitably follows day.
Another problem was that even if the "essential" quality
conferred by injury to property could be rationally translated from one
set of concerns (survivorship) to another (assignment), why wasn't the
existence of the survivorship statutes sufficient evidence for the claim
that the state had conferred to causes of action the "essential" quality
possessed by causes in which the injury was to property? At this point,
courts retreated to the mysterious claim that certain torts had "an
assignable nature" that was independent of the effect of any statute
passed by the state. When confronted with the question of whether a
trustee in bankruptcy could bring a claim against one who caused the

67. Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchs. Assoc., 128 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1942).
68. For example: Should fraud claims be permitted to survive in the common law? Pomeroy
assumed yes, but some states held otherwise, distinguishing between fraud that affected
property and fraud that affected the person. See, e.g., Nichols v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 155
N.W.2d 104, 108 (Wis. 1967) ('The crucial question is whether a cause of action to recover
damages for fraud is one for 'damage done to the property rights or interest of another.' ")
(citation omitted).
69. Weinberg, supra note 58, at 69.
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bankrupt to lose his business reputation, the Hawaii Supreme Court
said that
assignees can take only such choses in action as are of an assignable nature. An action
for assault or for seduction could not pass to executors or assigns, and we may say
generally that no action of which the gist consists of injury to the feelings or in which
70
injury or insult is an aggravation, can be assigned, voluntarily or by operation of law.

This response is open to two criticisms. First, it assumes a
jurisprudential worldview-some version of Langdellian formalismin which the law is comprised of essential, a priori concepts with an
71
existence independent of the positive law of the specific legal system.
Second, it leaves a puzzle: If there is some essential, a priori feature of
the common law called an "assignable nature" and some torts have it
and some do not, how is it that the law of assignment could change at
all? For most nineteenth and early twentieth century U.S. courts, the
problem solved by the equivalency principle was "which torts could be
assigned?" and it was taken for granted that contract and property
claims could be assigned freely. But there was a time when the courts
enforced the "doctrine of the non-assignability of choses in action"-that is, they prohibited the assignment of any suit for damages in
72
property, contract, or tort.
A "chose in action" includes "all personal rights . . which can
only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical
possession.'' 73 Holdsworth noted that the category of chose in action
included "rights to debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a contract
or a right to damages for its breach; rights arising by reason of the
commission of tort or other wrong; and rights to recover the ownership
or possession of property real or personal. '74 This extreme position

70. Austin v. Michiels, 6 Haw. 595, 595 (1885) (emphasis added).
71. Cook attacked Ames (or at least his formalist disciples) for making exactly this kind of
jurisprudential error:
[If Ames] meant by the statement that the rule of that a chose in action is not
assignable "is a principle of universal law" . . . that the rule is a necessary one, one
that must exist in all systems of law, it seems to be erroneous. . . . [S]ome at least
some of Dean Ames's students seem to assume that he meant ... that there is some
universally necessary and absolute principle of universal law-one that from the
nature of things exists in all systems of law.
Cook, supra note 20, at 818 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Langdell's common law
formalism, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM AND AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 78-92
(1998).
72. BODKIN, supra note 37, at 6 (citing FREDERICK POLLOCK, POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS 232
(9th ed., 1921)); see Weinberg, supra note 58, at 78.
73. Torkington v. Magee, [1902] 2 K.B. 427 at 430 (Eng.).
74. W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law,
33 HARv. L. REv. 997, 997-98 (1920).
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was practically impossible to sustain, and, as Holdsworth
demonstrated, slowly but surely, rights contained within the legal
concept of the chose in action were peeled off like the layers of an
onion. Through the creative use of legal fictions, such as the use of
75
equity to circumvent the prohibition of the assignment of contracts,
the common law "was induced to connive at the introduction and
extension of evasion[s] of its principle that a chose in action is not
assignable." 76 In what appears to be a frank admission that the
exceptions had swallowed the rule, the British Parliament lifted
almost all limitations on the assignment of choses in action for
77
property and contract.
The experience in the United States after independence was
similar to that of England, except that the pragmatic tendency that
eroded the limitations on assignments of choses in action in England
was even more pronounced in the United States. 78 In Comegys the
United States Supreme Court adopted a new theory of assignments in
bankruptcy that did not rely on the legal fictions developed by the
English courts and that reflected a skeptical attitude towards the
historical prohibition of the assignment of choses in action.7 9 As
Weinberg and other commentators have noted, U.S. courts did not
wait for legislators to ratify the liberal treatment of the assignment of
contract and property tort actions in law, as in England-they just
ignored the restrictions inherited from Blackstone and Coke.80 In Rice
v. Stone, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1861 noted:
[At one time a] thing in action, cause of suit or title for condition broken, could not be
granted or assigned over at common law.... But this ancient doctrine has been greatly
relaxed. Commercial paper was first made assignable to meet the necessities of
commerce and trade. Courts of equity also interfered to protect assignments of various

75. Id. at 1021; see also Master v. Miller, (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1042 (K.B.) 1052; 4 T.R. 320,
339 (Buller, J.) ("Courts of Equity from the earliest times thought the doctrine too absurd for
them to adopt, and therefore they always acted in direct contradiction to it."); Lee Aitken, Before
the High Court: 'Litigation Lending' after Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a
License to 'Bottom-feeders'?, 28 SYDNEY L. REV. 171 (2006) (reviewing the same history).
76. Holdsworth, supra note 74, at 1021-22.
77. Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. (Eng.) (contract); Real Property Act, 1845, 8 & 9
Vict., c. 106, § 6 (Eng.) (land). Note that special legislation was passed as early as 1330 allowing
executors and administrators to sue for trespass committed to the personal property during the
decedent's lifetime. See Weinberg, supra note 58, at 52.
78. Cook took issue with Ames' description of reception of English law of assignment of
choses in action, and argued that early American cases reveal that Colonial courts made little or
no effort to preserve the legal fictions developed so painstakingly by the English courts. Cook,
supra note 20, at 826.
79. Weinberg, supra note 58, at 61.
80. Id.; see also Cook, supranote 20, at 826; Radin supranote 20, at 68.
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choses in action .... And at the present day claims for property and for torts done to
81
property are generally to be regarded as assignable ....

The court, in passing, noted that Massachusetts's survivorship
statute was irrelevant to the question it was trying to answer, that is,
whether an otherwise-insolvent debtor could assign his only asset, a
tort suit, to one person and thus leave all other debtors without
recourse. 82 The court looked back on the reasons that had been
deployed against assignments in the past, noting that they fell into
two general types:
There were two principal reasons why the assignments . . .were held to be invalid at
common law .... In early times [an assignment] was regarded as an evil principally
because it would enable the rich and powerful to oppress the poor. This reason has in
modern times lost much, but not the whole of its force. . . . The other reason is, a
principle of law, applicable to all assignments, that they are void, unless the assignor
which he attempts to assign. A man cannot
has either actually or potentially the thing
83
grant or charge that which he has not.

The first reason is familiar to us-it belongs to the same
category of reasons as the three consequentialist reasons cited by the
Virginia Supreme Court in MNC Credit Corp., discussed in Part 1.84
The second historical reason against assignment is a bit more
obscure, and it is important to my argument not for its precise
content, but for its structure. The court referred to a "principle of law,
applicable to all assignments"-not just choses in action for personal
injury-which prevented inchoate assignments:
A claim to damages for a personal tort, before it is established by agreement or
adjudication, has no value that can be so estimated as to form a proper consideration for
a sale ... until it is thus established,85it has no elements of property sufficient to make it
the subject of a grant or assignment.

The court thus could distinguish the assignment of choses in action for
personal injury from choses in action for property and contract on a
different ground than the equivalency principle and, in a sense,
provide an argument for the claim made by some courts (see, for
example, Austin 86) that personal injury claims lacked an "assignable
nature." The operating distinction was between wrongs to vested
interests, which included chattel, real property, and contractual
81. Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. 566, 568 (1861) (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 571 ("[B]y our recent legislation actions for damage to the person survive; but we
do not consider this as materially affecting the question whether such rights of action may be
assigned to a stranger.').
83. Id. at 569.
84. MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickles, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333-34 (Va. 1998).
85. Id. at 569-70.
86. Austin v. Michiels, 6 Haw. 595, 595 (1885).
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expectations, in contrast to violations of personal rights, which
included "injuries to the individual, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation. 8 7 According to the
court, the former had an existence independent of the person who
brought the claim (and, presumably, whether the claim was brought
at all), while the latter did not exist until the party whose right had
originally been injured exercised his right to redress by choosing to
seek a remedy for the right that had been violated (and, presumably,
the court accepted the claim).8 8 This position is reflected in the
Uniform Commercial Code, which at first held that tort claims could
not be treated as collateral under Article 9.89 Even after it was revised
to reflect commercial realities, the revised Article 9 recognizes security
interests in commercial torts but not torts "arising out of personal
injury to or the death of an individual." 90
In summary, the history of the prohibition on the assignment
of tort claims for personal injury is a chapter (albeit the most
important one) in the history of the so-called principle of the nonassignability of choses in action. And the history of the nonassignability of choses in action is fraught with arbitrary decisionsnon-assignability has been whittled down over time through a series
of jurisprudential claims that look, to the modern eye, like post hoc
rationalizations. First, courts permitted the assignment of property
and contract claims through legal fictions such as the rooting of the
transactions in equity. Second, courts attempted to justify the
remaining ban on the assignment of some tort claims by relying on the
equivalency principle and reference to something called "an assignable

87. Rice, 83 Mass. at 570.
88. Id. ('The considerations which are urged to a jury in behalf of one whose reputation or
domestic peace has been destroyed, whose feelings have been outraged, or who has suffered
bodily pain and danger, are of a nature so strictly personal, that an assignee cannot urge them
with any force."). Arguably, one might view this as a primitive corrective justice argument for
prohibiting the assignment of certain tort claims. That is, one might argue that the court in
Austin was merely noting that, while there is a free-standing duty to repair a violation of a
contract or an invasion of property, a tort merely gave to the victim a right to demand repair; it
did not create a duty to repair on the part of the defendant. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 720 (2003) ("Under our system, a defendant's
tortious injury to another does not give rise to a duty of repair .... The defendant does not
ordinarily have a freestanding legal obligation to pay independent of any action against her.").
Even if corrective justice theory provides an argument against the commodification of lawsuitsa view I criticize in Section LV.B.-I still cannot see the reason for claiming, as the court does
here, that the duty to repair in contract and property preexists the claim by the right-holder yet
it does not in the case of tort.
89. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1972).
90. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(ii) (2000).
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interest." Finally, many U.S. courts abandoned this terminology and
tried to justify the distinction-maintained to this day in most
states-between the assignment of a vested interest and a personal
right. The idea that some legal claims are "personal" in a way that
makes their existence dependent on whether their adjudication
mirrors the relationship that gave rise to the wrong is, as I shall argue
below in Part III, based on the principle of the inauthentic claim.
B. Proceeds of PersonalInjury Claims
As any personal injury lawyer knows, while the prohibition on
the assignment of personal injury suits remains strong, the
assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury suit can be assigned
very easily at any time after the injury has occurred. On one level, it is
not hard to see why the law might treat the two kinds of assignment
differently. When parties assign a cause of action, they lose all control
over the disposition of that cause of action, including whether to settle,
for how much to settle, and every aspect of litigation strategy,
including the selection and compensation of attorneys. On the other
hand, when they assign just the proceeds arising from the resolution
of a suit, they retain virtually all the incidents of control associated
with "ownership" of the suit; they lose only the "fruits" of the suit. As
the Nevada Supreme Court put it, "[w]hen the proceeds of a
settlement are assigned, the injured party retains control of their
lawsuit and the assignee cannot pursue the action independently....
[because the assignors] retained control of their lawsuit." 91
Several courts have drawn a distinction between an
assignment of the cause of action itself and an assignment of the
proceeds of whatever recovery may be had in such an action, taking
the view that the latter is an equitable assignment, capable of
enforcement once the proceeds come into existence. 92 New York, which
has a statute that permits the assignment of any "claim or demand"
except "where it is to recover damages for personal injury,"
nonetheless permits the assignment of the proceeds of personal injury

91. Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 917 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Nev. 1996) (emphasis
omitted) (citation omitted).
92. See, e.g., Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) ("Any
specific thing,' debt or chose in action may be the subject of an assignment. Obviously, that
which is not in existence or cannot be identified cannot be assigned.") (citation omitted); Stathos
v. Murphy, 276 N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (App. Div. 1966) (noting that since personal injury torts are
non-assignable, "some courts, in order to save the assignment [of proceeds] ... hold that the
assignment does not take effect until the judgment is recovered or the money is at hand").
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suits. 93 Other courts have expressly rejected this view, however, and
have held that there is no difference between the assignment of the
action itself and the proceeds which may be recovered in such an
action, and thus that such an assignment violates the rule prohibiting
94
an assignment of a cause of action for personal injuries.
Among those courts that prohibit the assignment of proceeds
arising from claims for personal injuries, practically all enforce
provisions in insurance contracts that allow an insurer to recover
amounts paid under the policy for medical expenses incurred as a
result of personal injuries sustained by its insured, a practice
commonly referred to as legal subrogation. 95 One common explanation
for this exception is that an insurance contract's provision that gives
the right of subrogation to the insurer does not assign the underlying
claim for personal injury, but merely impresses a lien upon the
96
proceeds of any recovery obtained by the insured from the tortfeasor.
Subrogation is an equitable remedy with roots extending "to the
English common law and to the Roman civil law."97 Other states have
taken the view that subrogation is an assignment at law, but justify
this special exception to the general prohibition on the assignment of
personal injury claims on public policy grounds, basically for the same
sorts of reasons that the contingency fee was tolerated. 98 Some of these
93. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (Consol. 2001); see Grossman v. Schlosser, 244 N.Y.S.2d
749, 750 (App. Div. 1963) ("[A] person cannot transfer his cause of action but may transfer its
potential proceeds, thereby allowing him to do by indirection what the common law and the
statute expressly forbid.").
94. See, e.g., Karp v. Speizer, 647 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Albsent a statute
to the contrary a cause of action for personal injuries is not assignable."); Town & Country Bank
App. Ct. 1984) ("Illinois law has
of Springfield v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640 (Ill.
established that a cause of action for personal injuries may survive by virtue of the Survival Act,
but it is nevertheless not assignable, on public policy grounds.").
95. See, e.g., Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v Anderson, 263 So. 2d 149, 154 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1972) ("[A] subrogation clause limited only to a portion of the proceeds of a personal injury
claim sufficient to reimburse the insurance carrier for the indemnity paid its insured under a
medical coverage provision, does not constitute an assignment of the cause of action of the
insured against the tort-feasor. We further hold that the subrogation clause in the policy sued
upon does not provide for a splitting of the cause of action.").
96. See, e.g., Berlinski v. Ovellette, 325 A.2d 239, 243 (Conn. 1973) ("Some have concluded
that the policy provisions before them merely created an equitable lien against any damages the
injured insured might recover.").
97. M.L. Marasinghe, An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Early
History of the DoctrineI, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 45, 45 (1975).
98. Oklahoma, for example simply creates the exception by statute. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 2017(D) (2008) ('The assignment of claims not arising out of contract is prohibited. However,
nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the law in this state as relates to the transfer
of claims through subrogation."); see also Quality Chiropractic, PC v. Farmers Ins. Co., 51 P.3d
1172, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) ("[W]e think there are substantive differences between
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courts permit the insurer to take a full assignment of the subrogor's
personal injury claim, meaning that the insurer not only has an
assignment in the proceedings of any settlement or judgment arising
from the claim, but also takes an assignment of the claim itself, which
means it could bring suit against the tortfeasor even if the insured
does not want to. 99 Only a minority of courts do not permit any form of
subrogation by an insurer at all. 10 0
Furthermore, any state which has adopted the Revised Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code now permits a secured interest in
the proceeds of personal injury claims, while still barring secured
interests in the personal injury claims themselves. 10 1 That is because,
under the Revised Article 9, all proceeds from tort claims-even suits
in slander-are treated as "a payment intangibles" under U.C.C. 9108(e)(1) (2000), while personal torts (like slander) are still excluded

from the scope of Article

9.102

The history of the assignment of proceeds in personal injury
claims simply mirrors the pattern we saw above in the general history
of the principle of non-assignability. At first, in the nineteenth
century, courts used legal fictions rooted in equity to explain why the
assignment of proceeds from personal torts were treated like the
assignment of proceeds from other choses in action, even as those
same courts barred the assignment of personal torts and permitted
subrogation agreements and contingency fee contracts, on the one hand, and assignments, on the
other.").
99. See D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prods. Co., 120 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1963). It should be
noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, while permitting the assignment of the personal injury
claim, limited the insurer's recovery if they brought that suit to the amount that they had paid to
the insured.
100. Interestingly, Arizona does, by statute, permit the complete assignment of personal
injury claims to employers and workman's compensation insurers in the event of an injury to an
employee. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (2008); see also, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke,
576 P.2d 489, 492 (Ariz. 1978) (noting that the distinction between assignment of proceeds and
assignment of personal injury claim is "meaningless"); 8A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4903 (2005).
101. See Fifteenth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Pacific/West Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 301 F.3d 1150,
1152 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Section 9306 defined 'Proceeds' ... to include 'whatever is received upon
the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds.' But [section] 9104
provided that '[a] transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising out of tort' could not be
granted as collateral to a secured party.").
102. Id. at 1150; see also Adam Scales, Against Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort
Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 859, 941 (2002) ("Revised Section 9-109 governs sales of
'payment intangibles,' a residual category of general intangibles in which the principal obligation
is the payment of money. . . . Comment Fifteen [of 9-109] specifically rejects the supposed
identity between tort claims and their derivative payment rights: 'Note that once a claim arising
in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual obligation to pay, the right to payment
becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim in tort.' ').
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the assignment of all others lawsuits.10 3 For those courts that refused
to adopt this fiction, their resistance to the assignment of proceeds
met an irresistible force in the field of insurance-the insurance
industry simply had to have the power to subrogate proceeds from
personal torts, and except for a very small number of states, courts
found a workable exception, usually based explicitly on policy. Finally,
as the twentieth century progressed, and the distinction between an
assignment of the proceeds of a personal tort and the proceeds of all
other kinds of choses in action became more difficult to draw, the
courts that maintained the boundary moved in one of two familiar
directions-either adopting the justification that the assignment of
the proceeds of personal torts would increase maintenance and
champerty, 104 or insisting on increasingly implausible conceptual
torts
arguments about the inchoate nature of the proceeds of personal
10 5
claims.
property
or
contract
of
proceeds
the
with
in comparison
C. Prohibitionof Assignments of Malpracticeand FraudClaims
1. Malpractice
As illustrated in MNC Credit Corp., an additional area of tort
liability that may not be assigned is legal malpractice, where a
majority of states that have examined the issue have prohibited
assignment. 06 The courts have explored professional malpractice in

103. At law, there could be no assignment of the damages, because they were for a
personal tort, and the assignment could not take effect upon the award, because that
had no existence at the time. But it is otherwise in equity. Story, in his Equity
Jurisprudence, in section 1040, says: "Courts of equity will support assignments, not
only of choses in action, and of contingent interests and expectancies, but also of
things which have no present, actual or potential existence, but rest in mere
possibility."
Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 518 (1882).
104. Karp v. Speizer, 647 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
105. Sprague v. Cal. Pac. Bankers & Ins., Ltd., 74 P.3d 12, 21-27 (Haw. 2003).
106. The states that prohibit assignment include: ARIZONA, Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d
1345, 1353-54 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), abrograted on other grounds by Paradigm Ins. Co. v.
Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593 (Ariz. 2001); Schroeder v. Hudgins, 690 P.2d 114, 118
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); CALIFORNIA, Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App.
1976); COLORADO, Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492 (Colo. App. 1993);
CONNECTICUT, Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, 709 F. Supp. 44 (D. Conn. 1989); FLORIDA, KPMG
Peat Marwick v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 2000); Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle
Agency, Inc., 701 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997); ILLINOIS, Brocato v. Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass'n,
520 N.E.2d 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); INDIANA, Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind.
1991); KANSAS, Bank IV Wichita, Nat'l Ass'n v. Arn, 827 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1992); KENTUCKY,
Coffey v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); MICHIGAN, Joos v.
Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); MINNESOTA, Wagener v. McDonald, 509
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other areas less frequently. Medical malpractice claims may be
assigned only through the mechanism of subrogation, limiting the
class of assignees to insurers, and the value of the assignment to the
value of the insurance benefits actually paid or promised to the
insured, and not the actual value of the claims. 10 7 This follows
logically from the principle that, if subrogation is permitted as an
exception to the equivalency principle, insurance companies should be
able to sue physicians who injure their insureds the same as they can
sue their insured's primary injurers. On the other hand, most states
do not in any way restrict the assignment of bad faith claims by
insureds against their insurance companies, 108 although states are
divided as to whether punitive damages arising from bad faith claims
may be assigned. 10 9
An area of professional malpractice where assignment may be
allowed is malpractice claims against accountants. 110 Indiana and
Florida have permitted the assignment of malpractice suits against

N.W.2d 188 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); MISSOURI, Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578 (W.D. Mo. 1990);
NEBRASKA, Earth Sci. Labs., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.C., 246 Neb. 798, 523 N.W.2d 254
(1994); NEVADA, Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966 (Nev. 1982); NEW JERSEY, Alcman Servs.
Corp. v. Bullock, P.C., 925 F. Supp. 252 (D.N.J. 1996) affd, 124 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997);
TENNESSEE, Can Do, Inc. v. Manier, 922 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996);
TEXAS, Britton v. Seale, 81 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 1996); and VIRGINIA, MNC Credit Corp. v.
Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331 (Va. 1998).
A minority of jurisdictions allow assignment of legal malpractice claims: DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Richter v. Analex Corp., 940 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1996); MAINE, Thurston v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 567 A.2d 922 (Me. 1989); MASSACHUSETTS, N.H. Ins. Co., Inc. v. McCann, 707
N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1999); NEW YORK, Vitale v. City of New York, 583 N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div.
1992); OREGON, Gregory v. Lovlien, 26 P.3d 180 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); PENNSYLVANIA,
Hedlund Mfg. Co. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1988); and RHODE ISLAND,
Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, 728 A.2d 1057 (R.I. 1999). For a critique of the
majority position, see Michael Reese, The Use of Legal Malpractice Claims as Security Under the
UCC Revised Article 9, 20 REV. LITIG. 529 (2001).
107. See Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, Unlimited Subrogation:Improving Medical
Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261, S262-63
(2007) (proposing to change the current system to one that "allow[s] insurers to subrogate the
full potential medical malpractice claims of their insureds").
108. See, e.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 91 (Kan. 1990) ("We hold that an insured's
breach of contract claim for bad faith or negligent refusal to settle may be assigned."). It is not
clear why the assignment of bad faith claims against insurers are treated so differently from
malpractice claims, other than some jurisdictions may view them as contract claims, not tort
claims.
109. See Cuson v. Md. Cas. Co., 735 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (D. Haw. 1990) (reviewing cases
and holding that, since bad faith breach is a contractual claim in Hawaii, punitive damages are
not "personal" and may be assigned).
110. See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 57 (2010) ("Accountant malpractice claims may be
assigned.").
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accountants."1 Hawaii has taken a further step towards expanding
the assignability of professional malpractice. Like the rest of the
states, while it has prohibited on a case-by-case basis the assignment
of legal malpractice suits, its Supreme Court refuses to rely on a per se
rule based on the "special relationship" between client and lawyer so
often cited by the other courts.11 2 Hawaii holds that when an
assignment refers to damages that arise out of an injury to the person,
the assignment is prohibited, and when it arises out of damages that
are non-personal, assignment is permitted. 113 Thus it allowed the
assignment of a suit for "professional malpractice" and breach of
fiduciary duty against a law firm, since the injury caused by the firm
(loss of a building) was not "personal" to the client. 114 Florida, too, has
used the rubric of "professional malpractice" as a way to carve out an
exception to its prohibition against the assignment of legal
malpractice claims when it allowed a suit against a law firm to be
assigned because the work performed by the law firm was similar to
1 15
the work that an auditor would perform.

111. See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 765 So. 2d 36
(Fla. 2000) (allowing assignment of a claim of an accountant's professional malpractice in the
preparation of an audit); First Cmty. Bank & Trust v. Kelley, Hardesty, Smith & Co., 663 N.E.2d
218, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), distinguished by INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 709
N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (same); see also Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc., 701
So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1997) (allowing assignment of claim by insured against insurer for negligent
failure to provide auto insurance coverage to victim).
112. See generally Michael Sean Quinn, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 37
S. TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1996) (discussing some of the arguments against assignment considered by
courts); Pennell, supra note 27, at 493-94 (same).
113. Sprague v. Cal. Pac. Bankers & Ins. Ltd., 74 P.3d 12, 22-23 (Haw. 2003).
114. TMJ Haw., Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 444, 455 (Haw. 2007). The claim from
which the proceeds were assigned in Sprague was "for injury to the commercial credit and
general reputation of a business that was allegedly forced into bankruptcy," and this was deemed
a "personal tort." Sprague, 74 P.3d at 23-34 . The claim that was assigned in TMJ Hawaii,Inc.,
which was deemed not to be a personal tort was for "direct and quantifiable economic injuries to
the estate or property" of a building. TMJ Haw., Inc., 153 P.3d at 455. It is hard to see why the
torts in the two cases were treated differently, since in both cases the injuries were purely
economic without any physical loss.
115. Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. v. Kaplan, 902 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2005). But see Law
Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp., 969 So. 2d 962, 968-69 (Fla. 2007)
(distinguishing Kaplan as an exceptional case because it involved disclosures relied upon by
third parties).
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2. Fraud
The law concerning the assignment of fraud claims is not
uniform in the United States. 116 Since fraud is a tort that often
concerns pure economic loss, usually in the formation of contracts, one
might think that it should be freely assignable in the modern era.
After all, as we saw above, the earliest choses in action whose
assignability was recognized by the common law involved contracts
and "non-personal" torts that did not involve personal injury.
Numerous states have followed this line of reasoning, stating that all
fraud claims are assignable.1 1 7 Others have taken the opposite
position, stating that fraud claims are never assignable. 118 A third
group of states have taken the position that the assignability of a
fraud claim depends on whether it arose out of a personal injury or an
injury to property or contract. 119 The reasons courts have offered for
ending up on one side or another of the assignability question are
interesting because they reveal how difficult it was for them to make
sense of the law they inherited from England. 120 As with the "personal
torts," some states relied on their survival statutes to determine
whether to permit the assignment of fraud claims. 12' Some courts took
the opposite approach: Wisconsin held that, since its survival statute
explicitly provided only for the survival of suits based on damages to
"real or personal estate," the law prohibited the assignment of fraud

116. See Teal E. Luthy, Assigning Common Law Claims for Fraud,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001,
1026-28 (1998) (listing cases and statutes that concern the assignment of fraud claims).
117. See, e.g., Jandera v. Lakefield Farmers' Union, 185 N.W. 656, 658 (Minn. 1921) ("A
cause of action arising out of fraud or deceit is not a cause of action for injury to the person, but a
cause of action for injury to a property right, and is assignable."); see also Luthy, supra note 116,
at 1026.
118. See Morehead v. Ayers, 71 S.E. 798, 798 (Ga. 1911) ("A right of action for injuries
arising from fraud cannot be assigned."); see also Luthy, supra note 116, at 1026.
119. See Beall v. Farmers' Exch. Bank of Gallatin, 76 S.W.2d 1098, 1099 (Mo. 1934) (" 'The
mere fact that the right to enforce a claim which is itself assignable depends upon showing fraud
incidentally does not make such right of action nonassignable.' ') (citation omitted); see also
Luthy, supra note 116, at 1026-27.
120. Some states could simply rely on the explicit instructions from the legislature. Georgia
explicitly prohibits the assignment of fraud claims by statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-24 (2010)
("A right of action for personal torts or for injuries arising from fraud to the assignor may not be
assigned."); see also James v. Emmco Ins. Co., 30 S.E.2d 361, 363-64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1944) (citing
the Georgia code).
121. Minnesota, for example, looked to the fact that its survival statute mentioned only
personal injuries when it created the cause of action of wrongful death, meaning that all other
choses in action, including fraud, could be assigned. See Guggisberg v. Boettger, 166 N.W. 177,
177 (Minn. 1918) ("[A]ll other causes of action ... survive the death of either party. Under this
statute it is plain that a cause of action for fraud survives.").
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claims and other torts in which the victim suffered a diminution of
economic standing but not physical damage to property. 122 Typically,
assignment of a fraud claim
however, the courts that prohibited the
12 3
policy."
"public
on
outcome
justified the
By public policy, the courts meant that they were taking a
stand against assignments that were "naked" or "bare."124 The courts
meant that the assignee had no real interest in the property that was
the object of the assigned suit; all he or she wanted was to profit from
the vindication of the assignor's right. An example of what these
courts feared can be seen in Gruber v. Baker.125 Caroline Gruber sued
to take possession of some mines whose title was held by Baker.
Gruber argued that Baker obtained the title in a transaction with a
man named Pollard, and that Baker deceived Pollard. Pollard
assigned a "contingent right" to the mines to Gruber under which she
would bring an action to have the title taken from Baker and given to
her. Baker moved to have the suit by Gruber dismissed on the ground
that Gruber had admitted during discovery that she had promised to
26
give to Pollard the title to the mines were her suit successful.
Although it is not stated in the opinion, it is a reasonable assumption
that Pollard paid Gruber to bring the suit he assigned to her
(otherwise why would she do it?). In any event, the court struck down
the assignment:
122. John V. Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 70 N.W. 289, 291 (Wis. 1897). In 1907 Wisconsin amended
its survival statute to include "damage done to the ... interests of another."This was interpreted
to mean any interest which, "if lost or impaired would pecuniarily [sic] diminish the estate of
plaintiff," entailing that claims for fraud, malicious prosecution or even the alienation of
affection could be assigned. Nichols v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 155 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Wis. 1967)
(emphasis added) (quoting Howard v. Lunaburg, 213 N.W. 301, 303 (Wis. 1927)).
123. See, e.g., Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Johnson, 58 N.E.2d 849, 851 (Mass. 1945)
("It is doubtless the law of this Commonwealth that a right to litigate a fraud perpetrated upon a
person is not assignable at law or in equity, and that the prosecution by the alleged assignee of
an action or suit on account of the fraud would be contrary to public policy.").
124. See, e.g., Powe v. Payne, 94 So. 587, 588 (Ala. 1922) ("[I]t appears that complainants are
not entitled to immediate possession or enjoyment of any estate in the land and hence that they
are not in a position to file a bill for partition."); Simmons v. Klemme, 291 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ark.
1956) ("A mere naked right to set aside a contract on the ground of fraud is not assignable.");
McCord v. Martin, 166 P. 1014, 1015 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (holding that the cause of action
was assignable because it was "much more than a mere naked right of action for fraud and
deceit"); Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 61, 67 (1852) ("Before such an interest can be assigned...
the party assigning such right, must have some substantial possession.., and not a mere naked
right to maintain a suit."); Mulready v. Pheeny, 148 N.E. 132. 133 (Mass. 1925) ("A mere naked
right to set aside a contract on the ground of fraud is not assignable."); Cornell v. Upper Mich.
Land Co., 155 N.W. 99, 102 (Minn. 1915) (affirming that "an assignment of a bare right to [bring
suit] for a fraud.., is void as against public policy," but holding the assignment at issue valid).
125. 23 P. 858 (Nev. 1890).
126. Id. at 860.
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The deed passed from Pollard to Gruber with the understanding that it was not to
convey any interest in or title to the property whatever, but merely for the purpose of
allowing Mrs. Gruber to maintain this action in her own name, for the benefit of Pollard,
to set aside a deed made by Pollard... and which Pollard claimed had been obtained by
fraud.... [This] places the parties within the rule of law that the assignment of a bare
right to file a bill in equity for a fraud committed upon the assignor will be held void as
being against public policy .... 127

Gruber can be compared to McCord v. Martin, which also
involved accusations of fraud in the mining industry. 128 The McCord
plaintiffs were assigned the fraud claims of twenty-five fellow
shareholders in a mine. The twenty-five assignors had sold their
shares for five dollars on the advice of the defendant, one of the
directors of the mine, who secretly schemed with an outsider to gain
control of the mine in exchange for paying the defendant three dollars
per share bounty in addition to the five paid to the shareholders. The
court refused to prohibit the assignment of the fraud claims:
It is true, as the respondents contend, that naked actions for fraud and deceit are not
the subject of assignment under long and well settled rules of equity. But ... [iut is not
disputed that the form of assignment to plaintiffs was sufficient to cover the entire
equitable and property rights and claims of the plaintiffs' assignors in the premises, and
was thus a transfer of much more than a mere naked right of action for fraud and deceit,
since it included also the right to recover the respective sums of money which the
defendants had received .... 129

In each case the assignee or the assignor either promised to
give up or gave up one hundred percent of the value of the fraud claim.
In Gruber, the assignee promised to give the value of the fraud claim
back to the assignor after its adjudication (presumably in exchange for
a side-payment), while in McCord, the assignees gave the value of the
fraud claim to the assignors prior to its adjudication (presumably in
the form of a payment). Of course, the real difference between the two
cases is that Gruber had suffered no "personal" wrong at the hands of
the person she sued, while the assignees in McCord had.
The problem is that the phrase a "bare" or "naked" assignment
of a fraud claim, despite its evocative terminology, arose out of a
different context than the one raised by Gruber.130 The term was first
used in cases brought by purchasers of titles to disputed land, and
referred to the unique demand, in equity, that a party's standing to
sue follows title, not rights in contract or tort. For example, in Whitney

127. Id. at 862 (emphasis added).
128. 166 P. 1014 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917).
129. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
130. The expressions may have first appeared in Prosserv. Edmonds, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep.
196 (K.B.); 1 Y. & C. Ex. 481.
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v. Kelley the plaintiff in the case, the assignee of the loser in a
property dispute, brought suit to have the prior judgment in that
dispute set aside on the ground that a fraud had been perpetrated on
the court by the winner of the suit (the defendant now being sued by
the assignee). 131 The court held the plaintiff-assignee had no standing,
despite the fact that he paid good consideration for the land claim,
because in order for him to bring a suit in equity to set aside a
judgment he had to have equitable title to the property, which he
clearly did not have since the assignor could not have assigned what
he did not have (the assignor had nothing more than the "right to file
a bill" after he lost the original suit).132 It was in this context that the
California Supreme Court, like many other courts, quoted Story:
So an assignment of a bare right to file a bill in equity for a fraud committed upon the
assignor will be held void as contrary to public policy, and as savoring of the character of
Indeed, it has been laid down as a general rule that where an
maintenance .....
equitable interest is assigned in order to give the assignee [standing] in a court of
equity, the party assigning such right must have some substantial possession and some
capability of personal judgment, and not a mere naked right to overset a legal
instrument or to maintain a suit.133

Given that the assignee in Whitney most likely paid the
assignor the expected value of the land once title was legally restored
(subject to some discount for risk of failure), and given that the court
did not at any time question the genuineness of the assignee's
allegation of fraud by the defendant, this result must have come as a
bit of a shock and disappointment to the assignee. Like judicial
treatment of assignment doctrine above, it would be a mistake to
dwell too long on the peculiar legal fictions that produced this result;
after all, the California Supreme Court had no trouble reconciling this
case with a decision to permit the assignment of a suit for fraud in the
sale of property. 134 The distinction between assigning the right to
restore title lost by fraud on the court and the right to recover a loss
produced by a fraudulent contract is hard to see; even the California
131. 29 P. 624 (Cal. 1892).
132. Id. at 625-26.
133. Id. at 625 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1400
(W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., Little, Brown & Co., 14th ed. 1884))
134. See Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 274 P. 959, 960 (Cal. 1929) ("[T]he following demands,
claims, and rights of action have been held to be assignable: ... claims arising from the carrying
away or conversion, of personal property, from the fraudulent misapplication of funds by the
officer of a bank, from negligent or intentional injury done to personal property or upon real
estate... [and] where property is obtained by deceit or fraudulent device of any sort, the cause of
action is assignable, for here the injury is done in respect of the particular property which is
wrongfully acquired.") (quoting 3 THOMAS ADKINS STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY
86-87 (1906)).
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Supreme Court seemed unsure as to whether it could be
maintained.135
If we take a step back from the historical roots of the
condemnation of the "bare" assignment of fraud and ask what possible
principled objection could have motivated the courts, we return to the
familiar theme of the inauthentic claim. Although very few cases
involved the assignment of a fraud claim to a disinterested party (like
Gruber), it is worth reflecting on why courts opposed this sort of deal.
If, as the Connecticut Supreme Court noted, the assignment in Gruber
was made "in the absence of... fraud or mistake, [and the underlying
claim was] valid," where was the harm? 136 Courts who took an
absolutist position against this sort of assignment had a ready answer:
a bare or naked assignment was the very essence of "savoring of the
1 37
character of maintenance."'
As the Supreme Judicial Court in Massachusetts admitted in
Rice, the risk to Americans of harassment and oppression through
maintenance was practically non-existent. 138 All that remained was
maintenance born out of selfless reasons (for example, charity or a
public interest) or financial reasons (for example, to earn a profit). If
maintenance were to be prohibited because these reasons violated
public policy, the rationale had to stand on a different conceptual
ground than the one first mentioned by the courts, that is, fear of
abuse of the courts by social and political elites. Indeed, the courts
soon adopted a conceptual vocabulary to distinguish between forms of
maintenance that did not rely on fear of abuse of the courts. As the
Nevada Supreme Court said in Gruber:
The modern decisions of the courts of the United States and England make a distinction
which before prevailed in the rules of the common law, between maintenance which is
innocent and that which is unlawful. To maintain the suit of another is now, and always
has been, held to be unlawful, unless the person maintaining has some interest in the
suit, or unless he is connected with the assignor by ties of consanguinity or
subject of the
13 9
affinity.

For the Nevada Supreme Court, only a pre-existing interest in
the outcome of the suit, either financial or by family or friendship,
qualified as an "innocent" reason for a third party's decision to take
over a suit. The Nevada rule was taken from the 1835 English
decision Prosserv. Edmonds, where Lord Abinger stated that "[a]ll our
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 962.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fuller, 23 A. 193, 196 (Conn. 1891).
Gruber v. Baker, 23 P. 858, 862 (Nev. 1890) (quoting STORY, supra note 133).
Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566, 569 (1861).
Gruber,23 P. at 862 (emphasis added).
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cases of maintenance and champerty are founded on the principle,
that no encouragement should be given to litigation, by the
introduction of parties to enforce those rights, which others are not
disposed to enforce."'140 As the Gruber court explained:
The reason of the rule
is to prevent litigation and the prosecution of doubtful claims
by strangers ....If the owner is not disposed to attempt the enforcement of a doubtful
claim, public policy requires that he should not be allowed to transfer his right to
another party
for the purpose of prosecution, thereby encouraging strife and
1
litigation.

14

At the heart of the idea that certain forms of third-party
involvement in litigation were not "innocent" was that a claim should
be brought for the "right" reason. A claim which would not have been
pursued by the party who was wronged should not be entertained by
the courts, even if it was valid, unless it was assigned to someone who
had a reason to press the claim that mirrored the authenticity of the
142
assignor's.
The focus of any study of the law of assignment must shift,
therefore, from who brought a claim (which was always the ground for
challenging an assignment) to why a claim was brought. The former
question provided the form of the doctrine of non-assignability, while
the latter question provided its rationale-which in turn was based on
the more basic concern with maintenance. Assignment and
maintenance have always been linked on a technical level, since
champerty (which comprises the bulk of maintenance) necessarily
involves an assignment of the proceeds of a chose in action (this will be
explained in the next Part). My argument in this Article is that these
two doctrines are linked by more than a mere technicality, and that
they are linked by something much deeper, the principle of the
inauthentic claim. It is no accident that so many courts cited the
prevention of maintenance as rationale for the principle of nonassignability. While both practices were historically linked to certain
abuses of the legal system, nineteenth-century U.S. courts were
sophisticated enough to recognize that the risk of abuse by wealthy
140. Prosser v. Edmonds, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep. 196 (K.B.) 204; 1 Y. & C. Ex. 481, 497
(emphasis added); see also Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676, 681 (1857) (citing Prosser, 160 Eng. Rep. at
198)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 23 A. at 196 (same); Gruber, 23 P. at 863 (same).
141. Gruber, 23 P. at 862.
142. Thus, a party sued in fraud could defeat the claim if the assignor of the fraud suit
subsequently refused to cooperate in the assignee's suit even if the assignor did not repudiate the
evidence that supported the assignee's claim. See, e.g., Mulready v. Pheeny, 148 N.E. 132, 133
(Mass. 1925) ('It would be contrary to the fundamental principles of equity to allow Meagher, the
intervener, whose only interest in the personal wrong done to Mrs. Mulready arises from his
agreement with her, to prosecute a suit which she does not believe has merit .. ")
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litigants and over-zealous attorneys was not in itself a reason to single
out these doctrines among all others in the newly emerging civil
litigation system. The reason that these two doctrines were linked,
and were treated as a unique threat to the common law, was precisely
because both permitted someone who had not suffered a wrong to
exercise some degree of control over a claim for redress for a private
wrong suffered by a stranger.
III. THE CURRENT LAW ON MAINTENANCE
A. The Relationship Between Assignment and Maintenance
The reason that so much time was spent in the previous Part
on the justificatory role that maintenance played in the development
of the law of assignment is that what was true for the law of
assignment is still true today for the law of maintenance: underneath
all the precedent and confused (and incoherent) discussions of the
equivalency principle or the distinction between personal and real
property, the rationales for limiting assignment are parasitic on the
143
rationales for limiting maintenance and champerty.
The intertwining of assignment and maintenance can be seen
in two representative cases from the nineteenth century: Poe v. Davis
(1857) 144 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1891). 145 In Poe, the
assignors, who were locked in a protracted probate battle with other
putative heirs, assigned their right to the estate for $100 to the
assignees, who had no connection with the estate. The Alabama
Supreme Court voided the assignment on a motion from the assignors
after the probate litigation was won by the assignees. Although the
court cited Lord Abinger's views in Prosserto the effect that the estate
claimed by the assignees was a "mere naked right," the court
recognized that this conclusion was inconsistent with the fact that in
Alabama "distributees may assign their interest or shares in the
estate to be distributed."146 To buttress the claim that this assignment
was different, and could not be recognized by the common law, the
court noted that it could easily have been purely the product of a
desire on the part of the assignees to speculate in (or profit from)

143. See Prosky v. Clark, 109 P. 793, 794 (Nev. 1910) (suggesting that the doctrine of
maintenance is the basis for the limitation of all forms of assignment).
144. 29 Ala. 676 (1857).
145. 23 A. 193 (Conn.1891).
146. Poe, 29 Ala. at 681-82.
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litigation-even if, as the court conceded, the assignees "may have
acted very discreetly and fairly in the management of the
litigation."'147 To show that an impermissible speculative motive lay
behind the assignment proved that the assignees purchased a "mere
naked right," the court cited the fact the assignees had offered to
indemnify the assignors any potential costs that could be imposed
upon them by the court at the conclusion of the suit. Quoting Story in
this context, the court said an assignment that "savor[ed] of
maintenance" was one in which the assignor undertook to pay for "any
costs, or make any advances" beyond the cost of pursuing the suit
after the assignment. 148 In Poe an assignment "savored of'
maintenance because the claim was clearly sold for a profit, although
the court did not say whose profit caused the problem-the assignors'
(otherwise why would they have sold the claim?) or the assignees'
(otherwise why would they have bought it?). 149
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the Connecticut Supreme
Court upheld the assignment of an unspecified number of identical
fraud claims to Fuller, the assignee. Both the assignors and the
assignee had purchased life insurance policies from Metropolitan Life,
which they then surrendered to the insurer for a fraction of what they
claimed were the policies' true surrender value. Fuller successfully
sued the insurer in an earlier, separate case in New York and then
approached the assignors with the following offer: if they would assign
their claims in fraud to him for a dollar (which was in fact never paid),
he would pursue the insurer in fraud and divide the recovery with the
assignors. The insurer asked to have the assignments declared void
because they were champertous and against public policy. 150 The court
refused, noting that, although in the past, "public policy was opposed

147. Id. at 681.
148. Id. at 682 (quoting STORY, supra note 133).
149. The court alluded to its concerns that the assignees somehow would have an unfair
advantage over the defendants in the probate suit that the assignors lacked, but it did not spell
out exactly what those concerns were:
But when, as is recited in the assignment before us . .. a protracted litigation has
been carried on . . .and one of the contestants becoming uneasy, and willing and
desirous of selling out for a small sum ($100) . . . the seller allowing it to proceed,
being indemnified against all expense, cost and trouble; and the purchasers,
(strangers) who thus interfere bringing into the cause to bear upon the result
whatever of power, influence or adroitnessthey may command.
Id. at 683-84 (emphasis added).
150. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 23 A. at 196. Despite similarities with a modern class action, Fuller
was neither a class action attorney nor even the functional equivalent of a class action attorney.
Put simply, Fuller did not litigate the cases that were assigned to him on behalf of the "class" of
assignors-for example, he owed them no fiduciary duties.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1:61

to champerty and maintenance, and therefore all contracts which
'
savored of these vices were void," the "modern [law] is the reverse. "151
Absolute prohibition of all maintenance or champerty would "perhaps
not generally [ ] promote justice," and "the true inquiry may therefore
be limited exclusively" to the merits of each transaction. 152 The court
conceded that Fuller had taken "naked" or "bare" assignments, at
least in the sense that U.S. courts adopted these terms following Lord
Abinger's opinion in Prosser. 53 However, the court held that earlier
judicial hostility to the assignment of "a mere right of action" in a
fraud had to be balanced against the positive social consequences of
allowing men like Fuller to bundle together the assignors' claims (in
what was, in effect, a class action). 154 Unlike the Poe court, the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. court was not concerned with the fact
that Fuller, who was taking a fifty percent "contingency fee" to do
something which, in theory, the assignors could have done themselves,
was motivated by a simple profit motive and that the assignors were
seeking to enjoy a reward from claims that they were not willing to
55
pursue on their own.'
Poe and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. demonstrate that the
struggle over the limits of assignment in the United States was
indistinguishable from the struggle over the permissibility of
maintenance motivated by the "wrong reasons." As Poe demonstrates,
this concern, when it was made explicit, often took the form of a
censorious view of speculation in litigation, which meant, of course,
champerty. But the Poe court's hostility to the assignment of the
estate at issue in the case reveals more than just a concern for the
specter of third parties profiting from litigation. It also reveals a
concern with the impermissible motives that might lie behind the
original claimholder's reasons for permitting his or her claim to go
forward in the hands of another person. By the time Lord Abinger set
out his rule in Prosser, the idea that a chose in action could be
transferred to a stranger in property and contract was familiar, and it
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. ("It would manifestly be both useful and convenient to policy-holders of the plaintiff,
residing in this state, who... having... just demands, the individual enforcement of which, to
any person in ordinary circumstances, would be so expensive and difficult as to amount to a
practical impossibility, that a more fortunate person, of experience, ability and inclination,
should assist them, and wait for his compensation until the suits were determined, and be paid
out of the fruits of it.")
155. Id. at 196-97 ("[W]hatever was the motive of the defendants, whether selfish or
philanthropic ... we can discover no rule of public policy that would be thereby violated.")
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certainly must have been the case that these assignments, when they
occurred, reflected a speculative appetite. The Poe court's hostility to
the transaction it struck down was explicitly based on its disgust at
the assignor's desire to be indemnified for, and protected from, its
prior decision to claim a right rather than the assignee's desire to
profit from the case.
The real speculator in Poe was the assignor, and the court's
hostility to the manner in which the assignor made the sale must be
read in the context of the court's larger argument, which is that the
real risk to society of permitting this kind of sale is that it would
encourage more persons to try to sell "bare" rights. As noted above,
many U.S. courts accepted Lord Abinger's statement that the evil
permitted by maintenance was that it "encourage[d]" the enforcement
156
of rights that the original rightholder was "not disposed to enforce.
At this point the clumsy dichotomy between property rights
and personal rights that has been running through every effort by the
courts to make sense of permissible and impermissible forms of
assignment helps to illustrate the principle behind the rejection of
maintenance and champerty. Under basic common law theory, legal
rights followed property as it moved from titleholder to titleholder. A
wrong arising from the violation of a property right was, strictly
speaking, a wrong that ran with the property itself; the right to sue
the wrongdoer followed transfer of title. One can imagine that, as the
pressure built for permitting the assignment of contract rights, a story
could be told about how contract rights, except in personal services,
are like property rights. But, as the court said in Poe, if a claim in
court is only for the vindication of a legal right, then there is nothing
at stake which possesses an objective "capability of personal
enjoyment." 157 A bare legal right is nothing more than the power to
"overset a legal instrument, or to maintain a suit" against another. 158
Unlike objects in the world, which can properly be the object of
speculation, the "right to vindicate a legal right" cannot be the object
of speculation-it must be held by the person in whom it originated.
This is the principle of the inauthentic claim.

156. See Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676, 681 (1857) (quoting Prosser v. Edmonds, (1835) 160 Eng.
Rep. 196 (K.B.) 204; 1 Y. & C. Ex. 481, 497).
157. Id. at 682 (quoting STORY, supra note 133).
158. Id.
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B. The Ways States Permit and Limit Maintenance
As illustrated at the end of the previous Section with the
discussion of Poe, maintenance involves intermeddling (through
money or other support) by a third party who is not "innocent"-that
is to say, the intermeddler had no prior legal interest in the outcome of
the suit. Champerty occurs when the intermeddler provides something
of value to a party in a lawsuit in return for a portion of the recovery.
Champerty is considered a type of maintenance. Barratry has been
defined as the offense of frequently exciting or stirring up suits and
quarrels between others, and is also a species of maintenance. 159
Limitations on maintenance can come from two sources:
common law and statutes. Common law restrictions on maintenance,
in those states where they were recognized, typically related back to
English common law doctrines that the states received and
maintained after the American Revolution. 160 Even where the common
law was once recognized as limiting maintenance in some way, state
courts may have revisited those decisions, deciding that the common
law of that state no longer sustained the English rule (usually for
reasons having to do with the evolution of social and economic
conditions in the state) or the common law doctrine may have been
16 1
reversed by statute.
When it comes to maintenance, the devil is in the details. Like
the law of assignment, there are liberal and restrictive rules
concerning maintenance, and they are distinguishable in multiple
ways. The major distinction, and the one that interests most modern
readers, concerns champerty, or maintenance in exchange for a return
contingent on the outcome of the suit. Twenty-eight of fifty-one United
States jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) explicitly

159. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.13, at 489-90 (1986) ('The most
common kinds of impermissible maintenance involve financial assistance. Champerty is simply a
specialized form of maintenance in which the person assisting another's litigation becomes an
interested investor because of a promise by the assisted person to repay the investor with a share
of any recovery. Barratry is adjudicative cheerleading-urging others, frequently, to quarrels
and suits. All were thought to lead to a corruption of justice because of their tendency to
encourage unwanted and unmeritorious litigation, inflated damages, suppressed evidence, and
suborned perjury. Those, of course, are the same arguments that have traditionally been made
against other aids to impecunious litigants, such as free legal services and the contingent fee.")

(footnotes omitted).
160. See Radin, supra note 20, at 68 (pointing out the relationship between English and
American law with regard to champerty and maintenance).
161. Id.
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permit champerty, albeit with varying limitations. 162 This Section,
however, will analyze limitations on maintenance along a number of
dimensions, from the most restrictive to the most liberal.
1. Lawyer Maintenance (Contingency Fees for Attorneys)
Technically, of course, all fifty-one jurisdictions permit at least
one form of maintenance: the contingency fee. 163 At the turn of the
twentieth century lawyers began to offer to take cases without
payment unless they obtained a settlement or a judgment for their
clients, a practice that was flatly illegal under the doctrines of

162. These jurisdictions are: ARIZONA, Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d 458, 464 n.1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992); CALIFORNIA, Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124, 142 n.26 (Cal.
1987); COLORADO, Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Colo. 1952); CONNECTICUT,
Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460, 463 (Conn. 2000); FLORIDA, Kraft v. Mason,
668 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 1996); HAWAII, TMJ Haw., Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d
444, 449-50 (Haw. 2007); IOWA, Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene 472, 472 (Iowa 1852); KANSAS,
Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 809-12 (Kan. 1956); MAINE, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§§ 12-101 to -107 (2009) (partially amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516(1) (2009));
MARYLAND, Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709 A.2d 112, 119-20 (Md.
1998); MASSACHUSETTS, Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997);
MICHIGAN, Smith v. Childs, 497 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); MISSOURI, Schnabel
v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); MONTANA, Green v. Gremaux, 945
P.2d 903, 907-08 (Mont. 1997); NEW HAMPSHIRE, Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v.
Harwell, 606 A.2d 802, 803-04 (N.H. 1992); NEW JERSEY, Polo v. Gotchel, 542 A.2d 947, 949
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); NEW YORK, Leon v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511, 512-14 (N.Y.
1994), NORTH CAROLINA, Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 773-76 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008); NORTH DAKOTA, Interstate Collection Agency v. Kuntz, 181 N.W.2d 234, 242 (N.D.
1970); OHIO, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2009) (superseding Rancman v. Interim
Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003)); OKLAHOMA, Mitchell v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 444-45 (Okla. 1981); OREGON, Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or.
1891); SOUTH CAROLINA, Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000);
TENNESSEE, Record v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 438 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tenn. 1969); TEXAS, AngloDutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 103-04 (Tex. App. 2006); WASHINGTON,
Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978);
and WEST VIRGINIA, Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 151 S.E. 700, 700 (W. Va. 1929). This is based
upon the author's survey of the current state of the law. It is consistent with a survey by Paul
Bond. Paul Bond, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1297 app. at 1333-41 (2002).
163. The last state to finally permit the contingency fee was Maine. 1965 Me. Laws 333
(codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516(2) (2009)). On the other hand, the
freedom of lawyers to help maintain their client's lawsuits is not limitless. In virtually all
jurisdictions lawyers are prohibited from advancing funds to their clients, especially for living
expenses. See Michael R. Koval, Living Expenses, Litigation Expenses, and Lending Money to
Clients, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1117, 1126-27 (1994) (stating that courts interpret Model Code
section 5--103(B) to prohibit living expenses).
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maintenance and champerty. 16 4 Courts and legislatures quickly found
an exception to the restrictions on champerty such that by 1930, even
in those states that strictly prohibited maintenance, a lawyer was
permitted to "invest" in his client's civil litigation.165
But given the unique nature of this form of maintenance (it is
regulated by another body of law, namely each state's rules regarding
the regulation of lawyers), the more relevant question is how do states
determine whether, and the degree to which, non-lawyer third parties
may support meritorious litigation to which they are not a party. The
answer to this question is complex. As one commentator has put it, "in
short, confusion reigns over what the doctrine of champerty
[maintenance] is and to whom it applies."'6 6 It turns out that the
various state rules on maintenance can be sorted along a spectrum.
One end of the spectrum represents maintenance arising from motives
that arguably enjoy universal approval (for example, support of a
stranger's lawsuit based on purely charitable motives), while on the
other end of the spectrum are acts of maintenance that often receive
universal condemnation (for example, support of a stranger's lawsuit
motivated by pure spite towards the stranger's opponent). The various
kinds of maintenance can be set out according to the following
6 7
distinctions.
2. Selfless Maintenance
At one end of the spectrum are the states that ban all
maintenance, regardless of the reason or method by which the support
164. Radin, supra note 20, at 73 ("Contingent fees of lawyers, supported by a lien on the
proceeds of a suit, can scarcely be differentiated from the assignment of a cause of action, or
rather part of one.').
165. According to Radin, objections to the champertous nature of the contingent fee were
"ineffective" in the face of an increasing demand for legal representation as industrialization
brought more and more claims for compensation against railroads and other powerful
defendants. Id. at 70-71; see also Painter, supra note 48, at 639-42 (tracing the development of
contingency fee exceptions in champerty law).
166. Bond, supra note 162, at 1304.
167. Not all states have taken a position on the permissibility of any form of maintenance.
Nine states have judicial decisions that are ambiguous as to the current status of the common
law prohibition of maintenance: ALASKA, Wichman v. Benner, 948 P.2d 484, 487 (Alaska, 1997);
ARKANSAS, Bennett v. NAACP, 370 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Ark. 1963); IDAHO, Wolford v. Tankersley,
695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting); INDIANA, Reichhart v. City of New
Haven, 674 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996); NEBRASKA, Hadley v. Platte Valley Cattle Co.,
10 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Neb. 1943); NEW MEXICO, Rienhardt v. Kelly, 917 P.2d 963, 967 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1996); UTAH, Croco v. Oregon Short-Line R. Co., 54 P. 985, 987 (Utah 1898); VERMONT,
D'Amato v. Donatoni, 168 A. 564, 568 (Vt. 1933); and WYOMING, Johnson v. Sellers, 84 P.2d
744, 751 (Wyo. 1938).
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is delivered. 168 This would include, in theory, even non-monetary
support, such as moral encouragement ("Come on, you should sue the
guy who hit your car!") or aid ("I saw who hit your car; here is that
person's license plate.") It would also include support given to family
members and friends, or to members of one's church or school, without
any quid pro quo expected nor any independent gain by the
maintainer (other than the good feeling of having helped another in
need). This end of the spectrum, which I shall call "selfless
maintenance," is of little or no practical importance today, although
there was a time when certain states attempted to criminalize certain
forms of selfless maintenance when it took the form of advice and
16 9
support offered by civil rights groups during the 1950s and 1960s.
In NAACP v. Button the Supreme Court held that Virginia could not
restrict lawyers or non-lawyers from providing support (such as legal
advice, non-legal advice, and encouragement) by invoking the state's
power to exercise its police powers to limit maintenance and
champerty. 170 It can be taken as a given that, whatever a state might
want to do with its maintenance law, it cannot, under the First
Amendment, limit the power of laypersons to engage in selfless
maintenance designed to protect constitutionally protected rights
through litigation.
NAACP v. Button, however, reminds us that, outside of one
narrow exception, the police powers can justify the practical
elimination of selfless maintenance. Of the fourteen jurisdictions that

168. It could be argued that a more natural dividing line would be between the states that
criminalize champerty and those that do not. This is not correct for three reasons. First, it is
hard to determine whether champerty is still punishable as a crime in some states, given that it
may be a common law crime, albeit unenforced. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAwS § 11-1-1 (1956). Second,
among those states that have statutory criminal prohibitions against certain forms of
maintenance (Illinois, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, and New York), some of those statues
prohibit a very narrow range of conduct, for example, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (2004), while others
categorically prohibit maintenance for any reason, for example, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11
(2009). Finally, it is likely that the threat of a contract being voided under a common law of
prohibition of maintenance deters maintenance as much as the threat of a criminal sanction. See
Bond, supra note 162, at 1304 (pointing out that champerty's most visible impact is as a contract
defense rather than in criminal statutes).
169. See Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2241, 2248-52 (1999) (tracing the decisions of the Supreme Court that overturned state
statutes and allowed the NAACP and unions to assist in representing members).
170. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) ("However valid may be Virginia's interest
in regulating the traditionally illegal practices of barratry, maintenance and champerty, that
interest does not justify the prohibition of the NAACP activities disclosed by this record.").
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explicitly prohibit maintenance, two (Illinois and Mississippi) seem to
prohibit selfless maintenance. 171 Here is Mississippi's law:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... either before or after proceedings commenced: (a)
to promise, give, or offer, or to conspire or agree to promise, give, or offer, (b) to receive
or accept, or to agree or conspire to receive or accept, (c) to solicit, request, or donate,
any money ... or any other thing of value, or any other assistance as an inducement to
any person to commence or to prosecute further, or for the purpose of assisting such
person to commence or prosecute further, any proceeding in any court or before any
administrative board or other agency. 172

This language would, in theory, prohibit one neighbor to
gratuitously provide something of value (information, law books, etc.)
to another. Of course, this law has probably never been applied to stop
gratuitous acts of friendly "intermeddling," although one can imagine
that, from the point of view of the person whom the neighbor wants to
sue, the friendly maintainer is a bothersome busy-body, sticking his
nose into business that does not concern him.
3. Malice Maintenance
While the dangers of prohibiting selfless maintenance are, on a
practical level, quite minimal, it does represent one end of the

171. The fourteen jurisdictions are: ALABAMA, Wilson v. Harris 688 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1996); DELAWARE, Street Search Partners, L.P. v. Ricon Int'l, L.L.C., No. 04C-09191-PLA, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 200, at *12-15 (Del. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006); DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Design for Bus. Interiors, Inc. v. Herson's, Inc., 659 F. Supp 1103, 1107-08 (D.C.
1986); GEORGIA, GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2 (2009); ILLINOIS, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12
(2009); KENTUCKY, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (West 2009); MINNESOTA, Johnson v.
Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 675-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); MISSISSIPPI, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-911 (2009); NEVADA, Schwartz v. Eliades, 939 P.2d 1034, 1036-37 (Nev. 1997);
PENNSYLVANIA, Fleetwood Area Sch. Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment, 821 A.2d 1268,
1273 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003); RHODE ISLAND, Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d
901, 906 (R.I. 2002); SOUTH DAKOTA, McKellips v. Mackintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926, 928-29 (S.D.
1991); VIRIGNIA, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 100 S.E.2d 31 (Va. 1957); and
WISCONSIN, In re Estate of Katze-Miller, 463 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). All of these
states have explicitly held that their common law or statutes prohibit champerty. Certainly most
would permit selfless maintenance, if the question were ever presented to a court, although this
is a matter of speculation, which, as I will note below, introduces a degree of uncertainty which
may inhibit those inclined towards performing acts of maintenance.
172. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (2009). Illinois' law sweeps slightly less broadly:
If a person officiously intermeddles in an action that in no way belongs to or concerns
that person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to
prosecute or defend the action, with a view to promote litigation, he or she is guilty of
maintenance and upon conviction shall be fined and punished as in cases of common
barratry. It is not maintenance for a person to maintain the action of his or her
relative or servant, or a poor person out of charity.
720 ILL. COMp. STAT 5/32-12 (2009). Illinois allows selfless maintenance when the recipient of
the support is either one's family or a person who is poor.
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spectrum of how broadly a state could regulate third-party support of
litigation (taking into account the First Amendment rights established
in Button). On the other end of the spectrum, as a logical and practical
matter, lie a narrow set of motives for third-party support that are not
directly based on financial self-interest (as in champerty), but are
based on non-pecuniary motives that are the opposite of those that
motivate selfless maintenance. One can imagine a third party
gratuitously supporting a stranger's litigation with either money or
non-monetary aid, just out of pure spite or malevolence towards the
target of the person aided by the maintainer. This could be described
as malice maintenance. In Oliver v. Bynum, for example, the court
held that common law maintenance prohibited the gratuitous act of
helping a party secure funding to mount a lawsuit because the
maintainer desired to ruin the career of the person who would be
173
named in the lawsuit.
One could view malice maintenance in such a way as to
trivialize it as an analytic distinction while recognizing its
attractiveness as a common law doctrine. As the Idaho Supreme Court
observed, maintenance intended to injure another party (regardless of
whether it profited the maintainer) is not just maintenance, or even
primarily maintenance: it is indistinguishable from malicious
prosecution (which is also known as "the wrongful use of civil
proceedings") and abuse of process. 174 It might conceivably be tortious

173. Oliver v. Bynum, 592 S.E.2d 707, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). Arguably, this case, like
Toste Farm, 798 A.2d at 901, are cases of "regular" champerty, since it could be argued that in
both cases the maintainer, who were lawyers, were using their professional knowledge or status
to provide 'in-kind' services (not money) to support the litigation of a stranger (who really was
once, or still was, their client) in order to secure a long-term financial advantage. I do not
disagree, and this only supports my ultimate conclusion that the common law distinctions
currently employed to help lawyers and judges navigate the law of maintenance, champerty, and
assignment are formalistic and ought to be redrawn on the basis of policies untainted by
conceptual concerns raised by the principle of the inauthentic claim.
174. Wolford v. Tankersley, 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984) (Bistline, J., dissenting). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 674 (1977) ("One who takes an active part in the initiation,
continuation or procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the
other for wrongful civil proceedings if: he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings
are based, and except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the
person against whom they are brought."). Although section 674 is entitled "Wrongful Use of Civil
Proceedings" and restricts the tort of "malicious prosecution" to improper initiation of criminal
proceedings, many courts refer to both wrongful use of either the criminal or the civil process as
malicious prosecution, a convention adopted by this Article. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 682 (1977) ("One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other
for harm caused by the abuse of process."); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
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interference with economic advantage or prima facie tort.175 The Idaho
Supreme Court is probably correct, and the implication of this
conclusion is twofold. First, to the extent that the prohibition of
maintenance is based on fear of "malice maintainers," who would use
other people's litigation as a way to achieve their spiteful and socially
unproductive ends, we already have multiple doctrines that provide
exactly that protection; it is not clear why we need yet one more
doctrine. 76 Second, as a descriptive matter, since every U.S.
jurisdiction recognizes one or more of the torts of abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, tortious interference with economic advantage,
or prima facie tort, it must be the case that even a state that has no
law explicitly prohibiting maintenance does, in effect, prohibit malice
177
maintenance.
However, before leaving the subject of malice maintenance, it is
worth pausing to consider one tempting but bad argument for
specifically prohibiting malice maintenance: that malice maintenance,
178
if left unchecked, would lead to an increase in frivolous litigation.
This confusion is illustrated in the one recent work of scholarship
which attempted to clearly and explicitly discuss malice maintenance,
Paul Bond's 2002 article (in which the practice is referred to as
"malice champerty"). 179 Bond defined malice champerty as "the
funding of frivolous litigation by an otherwise disinterested party,

MALPRACTICE § 6:10 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that malicious prosecution derived from the torts of
champerty and maintenance).
175. The five elements for intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third
party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of
the defendant.
Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 733 n.6 (Cal. 1987).See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History
of PrimaFacie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447
(1990) (tracing the history of prima facie torts).
176. South Dakota, following this line of argument, equates malice maintenance with
malicious prosecution, although oddly, it calls this "barratry": "Barratry is the assertion of a
frivolous or malicious claim or defense or the filing of any document with malice or in bad faith
by a party in a civil action." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-6.1 (2009).
177. See Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591, 596-600 (Mo. 1955) (showing that
elements of abuse of process claim and malice maintenance-defined as "'officious intermeddling
in a suit'" in order to injure another-are indistinguishable).
178. See SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 3, at 5 ("[Tlhird-party financing encourages frivolous
and abusive litigation.").
179. See Bond, supra note 162 (defining and distinguishing "malice champerty" as a form of
champerty in general).
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with the purpose of harming or discomforting the defendant."'8 0 If, by
"frivolous," Bond meant a claim which is objectively unjustified, then
the definition is, strictly speaking, inaccurate. 8 1 While malice
maintenance could result in an increase in frivolous lawsuits, the
relationship between a malicious motive and the objectively false basis
of the suit is contingent. 8 2 Furthermore, in addition to non-frivolous
claims employed for an improper end, the courts sometimes see claims
which impose huge costs on defendants and the courts which are
deeply held principles-and
based on a plaintiffs idiosyncratic yet
83
frivolous.
face,
their
which are not, on
For these reasons, malice maintenance should be defined as the
support of meritorious litigation employed for an improper end. By
"meritorious" I mean non-frivolous, that is, where the claim is based
on (a) factual allegations that the plaintiff has a reasonable basis for
believing could be proven true, and (b) law which the plaintiff has
reason to believe a court could interpret in such a way so as to support
a result in the plaintiffs favor.' 8 4 Obviously, not all meritorious legal
claims would succeed if taken to trial, and not all meritorious legal
claims which have a lower expected return value than their opponent
85
in litigation are frivolous.1

180. Id. at 1301 (emphasis added).
181. "A frivolous action exists when 'the proponent can present no rational argument based
on the evidence or law in support of the claim'. . . . To fall to the level of frivolousness there must
be such a deficiency in fact or law that no reasonable person could expect a favorable judicial
ruling." Ridley v. Lawrence Cnty. Comm'n, 619 N.W.2d 254, 259 (S.D. 2000) (citations omitted).
While it is possible for a person to subjectively believe in the validity of a claim that is objectively
false, it is highly unlikely. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519,
530-34 (1997) (examining the ability of a plaintiff to subjectively believe in the validity of a
claim).
182. P may sue D under the tort of abuse of process even though D's suit against P was nonfrivolous-that is, based on true allegations and established precedent-if P can show that D's
suit was brought to achieve improper ends. This is in contrast, for example, with the tort of
malicious prosecution, which requires that the proceeding be brought without probable cause.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977); Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous
Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 687 (1997) (stating that
malicious prosecution requires that the suit be brought without probable cause in addition to the
existence of an improper purpose).
183. See, for example, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 154 (Wis. 1997),
where the plaintiff, a landowner, sued the defendant, a builder, for cutting across his property in
winter and won $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
184. This is the converse of Bone's definition of a frivolous lawsuit. Bone, supra note 181, at
533.
185. "[Nlot all unsuccessful legal arguments are frivolous." Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043,
1047 (2d Cir. 1990); see also George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (examining the likelihood that litigation will ensue in
terms of the expected return values of the parties). If only successful claims (from the ex post
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Frivolous litigation is not a necessary byproduct of
maintenance, whether malicious or selfless. 186 Therefore, if a state's
concern is with frivolous litigation (some of which happens to be
supported by a third party), it should just use the statutes and
doctrines designed to punish litigants and lawyers for making
frivolous claims and defenses, and for abusing civil litigation. 8 7 No
extra work is done by a rule specific to maintenance that targets
frivolous litigation since frivolous litigation is disfavored regardless of
who pays for it. The question malice maintenance raises is: How
should the courts view meritorious litigation whose adjudication is
likely, for various reasons, to interfere with the larger goals of the civil
justice system? 8 8 The answer may lie in existing doctrines of abuse of

perspective) were meritorious ex ante, then half of all claims resolved at trial are, by definition,
non-meritorious, which is not consistent with the convention of using "meritorious" in litigation
as a synonym for "non-frivolous." See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358,
1362 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing "frivolous" as "shorthand that this court has used to denote a
filing that is both baseless and without a reasonable and competent inquiry").
186. To be sure, the historical justifications for prohibiting any form of maintenance was that
third-party funding of litigation encouraged fraudulent lawsuits. The wealthy and powerful
would "buy up claims, and, by means of their exalted and influential positions, overawe the
courts, secure unjust and unmerited judgments, and oppress those against whom their anger
might be directed." Casserleigh v. Wood (Casserleigh 1), 59 P. 1024, 1026 (Colo. App. 1900)
(emphasis added). Whether this historical story was true or not, American courts held judicial
corruption had disappeared with the advent of modern reforms. See, e.g., Thallhimer v.
Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 645 (N.Y. 1824) ('In modern times, and since England has enjoyed a
pure and firm administration of justice, these evils are little felt, and champerty and
maintenance are now seldom mentioned.., as producing mischief in that country.").
187. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said in response to the argument that
restrictions on champerty were necessary to control for frivolous lawsuits:
[Such]
There are now other devices that more effectively accomplish these ends ....
devices include Mass. R. Civ. P. 11, 365 Mass. 753 (1974), providing sanctions for
misconduct, and G. L. c. 231, § 6F, regulating the bringing of frivolous lawsuits ....
To the extent that we continue to have the concerns that the doctrine of champerty
was thought to address, we conclude that it is better to do so directly, rather than
attempting to mold an ancient doctrine to modern circumstances.
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-27 (Mass. 1997); see also Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana
Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) ("We are convinced that other wel-developed
principles of law can more effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in
groundless lawsuits and the filing of frivolous suits than dated notions of champerty."); Andrew
Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 795, 811-12 (2004) (citing Bond, supra note 162, at 1330, stating that the goals of
champerty and maintenance are more easily accomplished through other legal mechanisms).
188. To quote Justice Thomas in a slightly different, but related context:
The common law consistently has sought to place limits on [negligent infliction of
emotional distress] by restricting the class of plaintiffs who may recover and the types
of harm for which plaintiffs may recover. This concern underlying the common-law
tests has nothing to do with the potential for fraudulent claims; on the contrary, it is
based upon the recognizedpossibilityof genuine claims ....
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process, malicious prosecution, tortious interference with economic
advantage, or prima facie tort. However, it is too easy, and it makes
the question of malice maintenance uninteresting, to assume that
such cases which attract third-party support are frivolous, at least
when compared to cases brought by plaintiffs-motivated by malice as
89
well-without any third-party support.
4. Profit Maintenance (Champerty)
Of the twenty-eight states that permit maintenance in some
form, sixteen explicitly permit maintenance for profit. 190 The
remaining states probably permit champerty-it is just that they do
not explicitly cite the investment by contract into a stranger's suit as a
permissible form of maintenance. This Article will assume that, once
attorney maintenance, selfless maintenance, or malice maintenance is
taken out of consideration, the remaining range of choices facing a
state that wishes to regulate maintenance concerns profit
maintenance, that is, champerty.' 9 ' In the sections that follow, I will

Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994) (emphasis added). One may not agree with Justice
Thomas' conclusion, but one has to respect his honesty: The real reason that tort reformers want
to change the basic rules of civil litigation is not because they fear a flood of frivolous litigation,
but because they fear a flood of genuine, well-founded lawsuits.
189. In these suits, of course, there is someone investing in the lawsuit other than the
plaintiff: the plaintiffs attorney.
190. The sixteen jurisdictions are: COLORADO, Fastenau v. Engel, 240 P.2d 1173, 1174
(Colo. 1952); CONNECTICUT, Robertson v. Town of Stonington, 750 A.2d 460, 463 (Conn. 2000);
FLORIDA, Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682-83 (Fla. 1996); IOWA, Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene
472, 472 (Iowa 1852); KANSAS, Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 812 (Kan. 1956); MAINE,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 12-101 to -107 (2009) (partially amending ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17A, § 516(1) (2009)); MARYLAND, Son v. Margolius, Mallios, Davis, Rider & Tomar, 709
A.2d 112, 119-20 (Md. 1998); MASSACHUSETTS, Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224
(Mass. 1997); MISSOURI, Schnabel v. Taft Broad. Co., 525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975);
NEW HAMPSHIRE, Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Harwell, 606 A.2d 802, 803-04
(N.H. 1992); NORTH CAROLINA, Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 774 (N.C. Ct. App.
2008); OHIO, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2009) (superseding Rancman v. Interim
Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003)); OKLAHOMA, Mitchell v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 444-45 (Okla. 1981); OREGON, Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or.
1891);WASHINGTON, Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186
(Wash. Ct. App. 1978); and WEST VIRGINIA, Currence v. Ralphsnyder, 151 S.E. 700, 700 (W.
Va. 1929).
191. There is a well-developed body of scholarship that analyzes and describes the evolution
of champerty in the United States by examining the litigation lending and funding industries.
GARBER, supra note 26; GEOFFREY McGOVERN ET AL., UCLA-RAND CTR. FOR LAW & PUB. POL'Y,
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
at
available
(2010),
SYSTEM,
JUSTICE
CIVIL
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf proceedings2010RANDCF272.pdf; Bond, supra note 162; Ari
Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1996); Hananel & Staubitz, supranote 187;
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identify the different ways that various states limit and/or permit
profit maintenance based on the following criteria: what kind of
lawsuit may be the subject of investment; how can the investment be
made; and whether the investment motive is the primary cause of the
lawsuit.
a. Restrictions on What Lawsuits May be Maintainedfor Profit
We can imagine mapping a state's champerty law along
multiple dimensions. For example, a state might restrict what may be
supported by a stranger interested in maintaining for profit.
Tennessee, for instance, permits profit maintenance in anything but
transactions concerning land. 192 Texas, which has one of the most
liberal bodies of law concerning both assignment and maintenance,
does not permit profit maintenance in certain areas of litigation, such
as legal malpractice. 19 3 Limiting profit maintenance on the basis of
what kind of suit the maintenance supports would seem to be an
obvious means of regulation for a state that wanted to support
champerty as a matter of general principle while recognizing that, as
a matter of public policy, there might be some types of litigation which
are ill-suited to third-party investment. It is odd, therefore, that states
rarely limit profit maintenance on the basis of what kind of litigation
is supported.

Susan Lorde Martin, FinancingLitigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL Bus.
& COM. L.J. 85 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly
Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57 (2000); Susan Lorde Martin,
Litigation Financing:Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market,
53 VILL. L. REV. 83 (2008); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation FinancingIndustry: The Wild West of
Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004); Julia H.
McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615
(2007); Marial Rodak, It's About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance
Industry and Its Effects on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2006). Some of this work is
explicitly comparative. VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US (2008); Peter Cashman & Rachael Mulheron, Third Party

Funding:A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312 (2008); Vicki Waye & Vince Morabito, The
Dawning of the Age of the Litigation Entrepreneur,28 CIV. JUST. Q. 389 (2009).
192. Record v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 438 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tenn. 1969).
193. Texas courts have invalidated six types of claims based on public policy: legal
malpractice claims, certain assignment of interests in an estate, collusive assignments
of insurance claims, Mary Carter agreements, settlement agreements enabling one
joint tortfeasor to sue another on the injured plaintiffs claim, and assignments of
claims under the [Texas] Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).
Christy B. Bushnell, Note, Champerty Is Still No Excuse in Texas: Why Texas Courts (And the
Legislature)Should Uphold Litigation FundingAgreements, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 358, 37677 (2007).
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b. Restrictions on How Lawsuits May be Maintainedfor Profit
(IntermeddlingProfit Maintenance)
More common are limitations based on how the maintenance is
performed. Of course, restrictions on how litigation is supported are
not exclusive of limitations on what litigation is supported; the two
might operate in complementary ways. The most common way states
control the how question in champerty is by limiting how much control
the investor has over the conduct of the litigation into which she has
put her money. We can say, therefore, that states sometimes limit
intermeddling profit maintenance: where a contract allows the third
party to take too much control over the conduct of what otherwise
would be a meritorious suit by another, the maintenance will be
prohibited. In Florida, for example, intermeddling means "offering
meddlesome,
unnecessary and unwanted advice or services;
194
esp[ecially] in a highhanded or overbearing way."'
Intermeddling profit maintenance can take many forms, and
there is no common test to determine whether the maintainer has
crossed the line into intermeddling. At a minimum, intermeddling
must mean something more than that the maintainer has made
suggestions which the party litigating the case has followed; in the
context of champerty, it must mean that the investor has bought the
right to make certain decisions about the litigation from the party
bringing the suit along with a share of the contingent outcome. 195 The
degree of control the investor obtained by contract can, in theory,
extend over a spectrum ranging from relatively minor control (for
example, control over what documents the investor can see) to almost
complete control (for example, control over selection of counsel or veto
power over settlement). At some point the control the funder assumes
by contract verges on full control over the lawsuit, and full control of
the lawsuit collapses the distinction between maintenance and
assignment. 196 Once the maintainer assumes full control of the

194. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
195. I recognize that it is possible that an intermeddler could influence litigation without
enjoying a contractual right to control, but in cases where a funder's suggestions are offered
gratuitously and are accepted entirely, it seems to me that, although the funder is a cause-in-fact
of the change in the litigation's direction, she is not a proximate cause. The proximate cause is
the funded party, who bears the responsibility for choosing to subject their will to that of the
funder.
196. See, for example, State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Profl and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI321 (2000), which described a litigation funding agreement offered in Michigan by a Nevadabased funder, containing the following conditions: (1) The funder had the right to order the
litigant to replace the lawyer currently handling the case; (2) the funder had the right to order
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lawsuit, she really is an assignee and the contract that brought her
control of the lawsuit is properly a contract of assignment, not
197
maintenance.
In American Optical, a federal district court, applying New
York's relatively permissive law of maintenance and assignment,
declared unlawful an agreement between a patent holder and a
stranger which transferred the patent holder's claim to the patent to
the stranger in exchange for the stranger's binding promise that it
would bring a suit to enforce the patent. 198 The court held that the
agreement was a form of champerty and that it was impermissible
because the party who was "maintaining" the litigation exchanged her
aid (in part) for control over whether the party aided could abandon
the suit. 19 9
Other states have held that a champerty contract that gives
the power to settle to the funder crosses the line into intermeddling.
The Minnesota Supreme Court voided a maintenance contract because
it required the plaintiff to pay the funder a set amount if the plaintiff
settled the case without the funder's permission. 20 0 Some states have
pointed to the absence of control over settlement as prima facie

the litigant to refuse any settlement; (3) the litigant had promised to continue the case "under all
circumstances"; and (4) the funder had the right to inspect any document in the litigant's (or his
attorney's) possession, regardless of the effect that the inspection might have on the potential
waiver of attorney-client privilege. The committee offered the opinion that no lawyer could
recommend this agreement to a client because it made the funder "in real terms" a "client" in the
case "with a co-equal, if not superior, decision making role" to the litigant receiving the funding.
Id.
197. See Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26, 29-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that an
agreement which limited the litigant's control over whether to sue at all violated Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(a), which requires the moving party to be the "real party in interest").
198. Id.
199. Id. at 29-30. It must be noted that, technically, the transaction in question was not
champertous but was an assignment, since the patent holder assigned its patent to the party
who presented itself before the court as the real party in interest. The court viewed the
assignment as a "contrivance" chosen only after the original patent claimant rejected the original
proposal by the assignee, which was that the assignee would fund the original patent holder's
enforcement action. Id. at 30.
200. But there is a still more objectionable provision in this contract, one upon which
we mainly rest our decision. It is the one which binds the defendant not to settle the
claim without the written consent of the plaintiff, and provides that, if he does settle
without plaintiffs consent, he shall pay the plaintiff a fixed and arbitrary sum,
without any regard to the amount or value of the services which the latter may have
performed.
Huber v. Johnson, 70 N.W. 806, 808 (Minn. 1897); see also Brown v. Dyrnes, 109 So. 2d 788, 789
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (noting that the funder had demanded a fixed sum if litigant settled
without his consent).
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evidence that a champerty contract did not permit the funder to
201
intermeddle.
The question of where the line between champerty and
intermeddling profit maintenance ought to lie is one that has not
received any sort of comprehensive review, and this Article will not
undertake that task. It is likely that there is a short list of incidents of
control which no funder can demand from a litigant in exchange for
support, and this list would include, for example, the power to select
one's own attorney, to accept or refuse a settlement, to abandon the
lawsuit, and to determine the theory of the case. It is possible that
outside of this short list, there is another list of "lesser" incidents of
control, none of which are necessary or inalienable, but where the loss
of enough of these incidents would "add up" to a loss of control large
enough to take the champerty contract across the line intermeddling
202
profit maintenance.
On the other hand, some courts have incorrectly held that the
mere fact of the champerty contract itself allows for too much control
on the part of the funder, holding, therefore, that all forms of profit
maintenance are really intermeddling profit maintenance. 20 3 The Ohio
Supreme Court declared a champerty contract unlawful because the
promise to repay the funder would necessarily become an additional
factor that the litigant would weigh in making the decision whether to
settle her case. 20 4 In the Rancman case, the court noted that the
$6,000 advance provided by the funder gave it the right to the first

201. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("[The funder did not]
concern herself with the antitrust litigation or impose her views upon the attorneys or the
litigants once she provided the loan."); Clifford v. Wilcox, 27 P.2d 722, 725 (Wash. 1933) (noting
that the funder did not control settlement).
202. While control over settlement cannot be given over to the funder, the funder might
legitimately demand that if the litigant wants to accept a settlement the funder believes is too
low, given the funder's own estimate of the expected value of the case, the litigant must permit
the funder to exercise an option (written into the champerty contract, of course) to take an
assignment in the case. Similarly, while the funder cannot control the "theory of the case," which
must be kept in the hands of the party in interest, the funder might insist that none of the funds
provided to the litigant (assuming that the funds were dedicated to pay for litigation expenses)
be used for a particular legal expense with which the funder disagrees (e.g., an expert the funder
believes is ill-suited to the litigant's own theory of the case). Even if these 'lesser" rights are
permitted individually, it may be that if a funder demanded both of them (plus others I have not
set out), a court would correctly hold that the funder had overreached and was now
intermeddling.
203. See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003)
(finding that a champerty contract implicitly impedes the settlement of lawsuits); see also
Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 679-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (endorsing Rancman).
204. Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 221.
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$16,800 of the settlement if the case settled within twelve months. 20 5
Therefore, it hypothesized:
[I]f there had not been any superior liens on [the litigant]'s settlement and her attorney
had charged a 30 percent contingency fee, [she] would not have received any funds from
a settlement of $ 24,000 or less. This ...gives [her] an absolute disincentive to settle for
she
$ 24,000 or less because she would keep the $6,000 advance regardless of whether
206
settles.., and would not receive any additional money from a $ 24,000 settlement.

The court concluded that the agreement between the funder and the
litigant intermeddled with the lawsuit because it could "prolong
'20 7
litigation and reduce settlement incentives.
The Ohio Supreme Court is correct descriptively-the fact that
the litigant has a contingent debt after agreeing to the contract offered
by the funder does in fact increase the total settlement that the
litigant will have to recover in order to be better off than had she not
signed the contract and settled the case. But this is trivially true
about any contractual relationship assumed by the litigant which is
payable out of the contingent settlement (or award) the litigant
receives, including the contingency fee agreement the litigant signed
with her attorney. The counterparty to these contracts is not in
"control" of the litigation merely because he has, in exchange for a
valuable service (that is, something the litigant freely chose to pay
for), increased the amount that the plaintiff must receive from the
defendant in order to obtain a positive outcome from the litigation.
The fact that the litigant's incentive structure with regard to future
settlement is affected by champertous contracts does not mean that
the funder is intermeddling with the litigant's case. 20 8 This is not to
deny that there may be policy-based reasons for setting outer
boundaries to the ratio between the expected amount to be repaid in
the event of a favorable outcome and expected value of the lawsuit; it
is just to say that the argument for limiting profit maintenance based
on the claim that any ex ante increase in the settlement value of a
case always converts the investment into a form of intermeddling
profit maintenance is wrong.

205. Id. at 220.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 221.
208. While the existence of [the funders'l lien on the proceeds of Plaintiffs recovery
may have influenced some of Plaintiffs decisions regarding her personal injury claim,
Plaintiff simply has not demonstrated that [the funders] attempted to control the
resolution of her claim for the purpose of stirring up strife and continuing litigation.
Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
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c. Restrictions on the Cause of the Maintenancefor Profit
("But-For"Profit Maintenance)
Some states are less concerned with issues of control than with
the fear that a champertous contract is the efficient cause of a lawsuit
that otherwise would not have existed. For example, Colorado rejected
the category of intermeddling maintenance, or at least, its courts have
never held that a champertous contract was unlawful because it
allowed the funder to take too much control over the litigation. In
Bashor v. Northland Insurance Co., the Colorado Supreme Court held
that control over attorney selection was not an essential element to
remaining a party-in-interest, and suggested that if a funder
maintained control over this as well as other major aspects of the
litigation, then the contract was not unlawful. 20 9 Colorado took the
position that, if the suit brought is meritorious-meaning that the
plaintiff wanted to bring it, but was wanting of resources-then the
degree of control exercised by the funder is irrelevant. 21 0 On the other
hand, Colorado has developed a definition of intermeddling that
potentially sweeps many more champertous contracts across the line
into illegality. The Eighth Circuit summarized a series of Colorado
opinions to stand for the proposition that "intermeddling" meant

209. Bashor v. Northland Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 864, 867 (Colo. App. 1970). The case arose in the
context of assignment: The assignor, whose only asset was the expected return from a bad faith
claim against his insurer, assigned that claim to the party who had been the original plaintiff in
the underlying suit that gave rise to the bad faith claim. The defendant insurance company
moved to have the assignee dismissed from the case on the ground that it was not the real party
in interest, in part because the assignor maintained significant control over the conduct of the
case by the assignee. Compare Bashor, 480 P.2d at 867, with Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56
F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (involving a case where one party assigned its rights to certain patents
to a third party in exchange for the third party bringing suit to enforce the patent). In fact, the
court pointed to the irony of an insurer making this argument against the assignment, since
virtually every insurance contract contains a clause reserving to the insurer the right to control
the selection of counsel in any suit brought by the insured involving the redress of an injury to
the insured for which the insurer is responsible. Bashor,480 P.2d at 867.
210. [The rule against champerty] was never intended, although possibly such cases
might have come within the strict letter and reading of the old rule, to prevent poor
persons from charging the subject-matter of the suit in order to secure the means to
assert and enforce their rights by legitimate methods and in a legitimate manner.
Casserleigh I, 59 P. 1024, 1027 (Colo. App. 1900) (citations omitted). Colorado courts will not
permit malice maintenance, even if the plaintiff would have brought a meritorious suit "but for"
the want of resources:
[S]uch contracts .. .will not be enforced from reasons based upon considerations of
public policy and good morals, if it appears that they were entered into, not with the
bona fide object of assisting a claim believed to be meritorious and just, but for the
purpose of injuring and oppressing others.
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encouraging (or causing) another to bring a suit "which otherwise he
2 11
would not have brought.
The evil of intermeddling, according to the view adopted by
Colorado, does not stem from the participation of a stranger in an
otherwise legitimate lawsuit, but stems from the fear that "but-for"
the stranger's conscious decision that the lawsuit ought to be brought,
the lawsuit would never have occurred. 2 12 Casserleigh v. Wood is a
good illustration of but-for maintenance. A "stranger" (Casserleigh)
approached the Wood family with a piece of evidence that was crucial
to proving that they had a valid claim for land that had once been
owned by their deceased father. Apparently, the Woods had wanted to
bring the suit but did not because they lacked "crucial" evidence
without which "the Woods could not successfully maintain any action,"
and this evidence was in Casserleigh's possession. 213 Casserleigh
offered the evidence to the Woods on the condition that, if they used it
and they recovered the land (or a sum in compensation for the loss of
2 14
the land), they would give a portion of that recovery to Casserleigh.
The Woods agreed, recovered, and refused to pay Casserleigh,
claiming that, under the common law, the contract was void for public
21 5
policy because it was champertous.
The court noted that unlike the common law definition once
adopted in England and adopted by other states, the statutory
definition of maintenance in Colorado did not prohibit any "taking in
hand or upholding of quarrels or sides" in a lawsuit by any means and
it certainly did not prohibit profit maintenance. 216 Colorado only
prohibited malice maintenance (maintenance with "the purpose of
injuring and oppressing others") and "but-for" maintenance
(maintenance "for the purpose of stirring up strife inducing suits to be

211. Casserleigh v. Wood (Casserleigh I), 119 F. 308, 312 (8th Cir. 1902) ("[Champerty] is
committed when a man, with a view of fomenting litigation, encourages another to bring a suit or
to make a defense which otherwise he would not have brought or made.") (emphasis added). It is
interesting that the federal court thought that the doctrine of maintenance (and the limits it
imposed) applied to third party support of plaintiffs or defendants. In 1902 Colorado was in the
Eighth Circuit.
212. The "but for" test for causation is a familiar one in law; it is also known as the sine qua
non or counterfactual test. It holds simply that an act is a legal cause if it was necessary (but not
necessarily sufficient) to produce the effect in question. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
431 (1965) (stating what constitutes legal cause); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 55, at 218
(addressing legal cause).
213. Wood v. Casserleigh, 30 Colo. 287, 290 (1902).
214. Casserleigh1, 59 P. at 1025.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1027.
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begun which would otherwise not be commenced"). 217 The fact that the
funder in this case was in fact selling evidence in exchange for a
portion of the lawsuit in which the evidence was to be introduced did
not bother the court. 218 All that mattered was that the funder acted
"with the bona fide object of assisting a claim believed to be
meritorious" and that the party who was funded was already inclined
to bring the lawsuit:
[The maintenance contract] recites . . .the desire of the [litigants] to prosecute their
rights, and a reasonable presumption from the language used would be that it was their
intention for this purpose to institute suit, or to cause suit to be instituted in their
behalf. There is nothing upon the face of the contract to indicate that the [funder] induced
the bringing of a suit which would otherwise have not been commenced, or that the acts
to be performed by him were for the promotion of litigation, in the sense in which those
words are used in all the authorities; but, on the contrary, a conclusive presumption
from the language used, and from the results obtained by the suit, is that they were to
up and
aid a legitimate suit, to be instituted in good faith, not for the purpose of stirring
2 19
encouraging strife, but for the legitimate purpose of enforcing legitimate rights.

The idea behind drawing the line between lawful and unlawful
champerty at "but-for maintenance" is that "unnecessary" litigation
220
ought to be discouraged. This idea has a historical pedigree.
According to Stephen Presser, "it was originally a mainstay of the
Anglo-American legal culture that one should try one's best to resolve
disputes out of court, [and] that litigation was something of an evil,
and that it ought to be resorted to only if all other means [of
accommodation] failed. '221 Even in 1936, Max Radin conceded that
"the psychological background [of the common law] is the medieval
and Christian one in which litigation is at best a necessary evil, and
litigiousness a vice. 2 22
But what, exactly, evidenced that litigation, having been
brought, was brought only because it was "necessary"? As Radin
noted, the common law's critics of third-party involvement took the
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1028-29 (" '[Ain agreement to pay one for the disclosure of instruments for proof
of claims asserted in courts of justice is valid, unless the production of the same could be a
dereliction of duty on the part of the person producing the evidence.' ") (citation omitted). The
court noted that the agreement was not directed to the suppression of truthful evidence, but
towards the production of truthful evidence, something that is in the public interest. Id. at 1029.
219. Id. at 1027-28 (emphasis added).
220. This is not to say that as a matter of history, the rule of 'but-for maintenance' was
universally accepted in England or the United States. The real story is much more nuanced, as
will be seen in the next Part.
221. Stephen B. Presser, How Did We Get Here? What Litigation Was, What It Is Now, What
It Might Be 7, COMMON GOOD (June 27, 2005), http://commongood.org/assets/attachments
/142.pdf (emphasis added).
222. Radin, supra note 20, at 68.
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view that if the person who suffered the original harm did not initially
pursue a valid claim, it ought not to be brought. 223 Kent, for example,
believed that it was a "principle common to the laws of all well
governed countries that no encouragement should be given to
litigation by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights which
others are not disposed to enforce. '22 4 Coke, in explaining why he
opposed contingency fees, said that they would bring into the courts
claims that "they [the parties in interest] would not venture to go in
225
upon their own bottoms."
The test offered by Kent and Coke is a "but for" test-if, but for
the introduction of the funder's resources, the litigant would not have
been able to bring a suit, the lawsuit was unlawful. The test Kent and
Coke recommended simply categorically prohibits maintenance in
which the support is provided before the lawsuit has been filed. 226 The
suit brought by the Woods in Casserleigh would fail this test. The
Woods could not have "venture[d] to go in upon their own bottoms"
and would not have filed suit without the crucial piece of evidence
provided by Casserleigh.
And yet the Colorado court did not view the suit brought by the
Woods as unlawful and did not hold that the introduction of necessary
resources by an outsider made the litigation unlawful. How could this
be? From a logical point of view, it would seem that the "but-for" test
would have compelled the opposite result in Casserleigh. Obviously,
the Colorado court must have meant "but for" in a way that went
beyond the simple mechanics of litigation. It was not enough that butfor the funder's act, the litigant would have been materially incapable
of filing suit. The court must have meant that, for the funder's act to
be intermeddling, it would have to be the case that but-for the funder's
actions, the litigant would not have developed the desire or interest in
pursuing the suit. Kent and Coke embraced the first meaning of "butfor" maintenance, which might be called "material but-for
maintenance" while the Casserleigh court embraced the second
meaning of "but-for" maintenance, which might be called "desire butfor maintenance."

223. Id. at 48.
224. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 528 n.(c) (John Gould ed., Little,
Brown & Co. 1896) (1826) (emphasis added).
225. WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 255 (n.p. 1716).
226. Blackstone conceded that maintenance motivated by "charity and compassion"-e.g.,
selfless maintenance-could be allowed by the common law. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *134.
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The Casserleigh court said it would be supremely unjust if the
Woods could not pursue the lawsuit just because, although they knew
that their rights were being violated, and they wanted to secure their
rights, they lacked the resources necessary to sue. 227 A test of
"material but-for maintenance" would make it impossible for litigants
to sue even if the purpose and plan behind the suit were wholly their
own and the appearance of the funder was a mere happy accident
upon which the litigants seized. On the other hand, the test of "desire
but-for maintenance" would, in theory, prevent only those suits by
litigants who either did not know they had suffered an injury (or had a
claim) until approached by the funder, or did not care about the injury
or claim until the funder planted within them a sense of injury
228
sufficient to motivate them to bring a suit.
On a practical level, it could be very hard to discern whether
litigants like the Woods "contemplated and desired . . . to assert their
rights" before they were approached by an investor (and if they did,
how much they contemplated their "lost" rights and how intensely
they contemplated them). The question of proof and the risk of fraud
in answering this question threaten to swamp the otherwise
praiseworthy goals which the law of champerty would secure if it
excluded only "desire but-for maintenance." 229 Even if one disagreed
with Kent and Coke as a matter of principle, one could see why some
courts might think that the best and most direct evidence of whether a
litigant wanted to bring a suit was whether the litigant did bring a
suit. If a court took this position simply from a pragmatic point of view
of choosing a rule that was easy to apply, it would, in effect, adopt a
rule that barred champerty in cases where the investor promised
support to the litigant before the litigant filed her suit.
The discussion about the problems of proof connected with
excluding "desire but-for maintenance" may explain why New York's
227. A poor man may have the right upon his side, but be without means to enforce
such rights in the courts, and possibly against some powerful adversary. Surely, it
cannot be said that in such case it is the intent of the law to prohibit a friend from
assisting him with the necessary money to enforce his rights, dependent for his
reimbursement solely upon the contingency of securing a portion of the property
which may be obtained by the litigation; this being the only security or chance for
repayment which the party could give or have.
Casserleigh1, 59 P. at 1026 (emphasis added).
228. The contract between the investor and the litigants in Casserleighdid not cross the line
into "desire but-for maintenance" because "[i]n the case at bar, it appears that the [litigants]
contemplated and desired the bringing of a suit to assert their rights" before they were
approached by the investor. Id. at 1027.
229. "[1]t may be said, on the other hand, that such assistance or maintenance may have a
tendency to secure rights and promote the ends of justice." Id. at 1026.
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law of assignment and maintenance is concerned almost exclusively
with contracts made before the lawsuit is filed. 230 There is no common
law prohibition of maintenance (or champerty) in New York. The only
governing law is a statute, §489 of the Judiciary Law. The statute is
violated if "the foundational intent to sue on [the] claim [was] at least.
. . the primary purpose for. . . . if not the sole motivation behind,
entering into the transaction. '231 While the primary focus of §489
litigation has been over the permissibility of full assignments of claims
prior to the filing of lawsuits by the assignee, §489 also applies to
maintenance contracts. 232 In both cases the evil that the law was
designed to prevent was the ability of "attorneys and corporations to
purchase claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon." 233 In the
words of one judge, the point of §489 was to insure that strangers
could not purchase "a hunting license" to bring actions that would not
otherwise have been brought. 23 4 The "rule" that only if a lawsuit had
already been filed before the stranger added his or her extra support
served as a rough proxy for the "desire but-for maintenance" rule. This
is so since it can be assumed that, if someone who has a right goes
through the trouble of insisting on that right in court before receiving

230. See, e.g., Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("Section 489 prohibits assignments 'for the purpose of bringing an action' and thus, read
strictly, extends only to the 'transfer of claims prior to the institution of any proceeding or
action.' ") (quoting Rosenkrantz v. Berlin, 317 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (1971)).
231. Bluebird Partners v. First Fid. Bank, 94 N.Y.2d 726, 736 (2000).
232. The most recent statement to this effect came out in 2004, which permitted the partial
assignment to a third party of the money owed to a property owner by its fire insurer:
Here, the loans were made after the action was commenced and pending, and thus
were not made "with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action." Further,
plaintiff did not assign his claim against defendants ... but merely assigned to [the
third [party] an interest in the proceeds of the policy.
Fahrenholz v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 13 A.D.3d 1085, 1086 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (emphasis added).
The question of the primacy of the intent to sue was raised recently in Trust for the Certificate
Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors v. Love Funding Corp., 918 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y.
2009). This question was certified to the New York Court of Appeals by the Second Circuit, but
the New York court was able to resolve the case without reaching the question. Since this case
involved an assignment of a chose of action that was filed after the assignment, it did raise an
important question about the significance of the New York rule that all assignments, whether
partial or full, had to occur after the lawsuit had been filed. The Court of Appeals did not reach
this question, however, since the unanimous opinion by Judge Pigott held that as a matter of
law, it is not champerty for a party to purchase a full (or partial) interest in a lawsuit in which it
has a "pre-existing interest" in the lawsuit, and that the assignee could have had a pre-existing
interest in this case. See also Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortg.
Investors, Inc. v. Love Funding Corp., 591 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that as a matter of
law the assignee had a pre-existing interest).
233. Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 28 N.Y.2d 325, 329 (1971).
234. Refac Int'l v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 131 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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any help or promise of anything of value from anyone, it can be safely
assumed that he or she truly desired to have his or her right
vindicated, and was not influenced by the encouragement of a
stranger (whose encouragement may have taken the form of a bribe).
Of course, it could be asked why the limit on champertypractical or theoretical-needs to be drawn where Colorado and New
York have tried to draw it. Why does it matter, for example, whether
or not the Woods' claim was something already in their minds when
they were approached by Casserleigh? Casserleigh's evidence was,
according to the court, honest and relevant; had the facts been that
the Woods had, until Casserliegh, never heard of their father's
property claim, the evidence would not magically have become less
honest and relevant. And yet, according to the rule of "desire but-for
maintenance," if Casserleigh's offer to provide the crucial evidence
would have been the but-for cause of the Woods coming to believe that
they had a claim (or, coming to believe that they should sue), the
resulting lawsuit should not have gone forward-a position endorsed

by the Colorado court.

235

The rule against "desire but-for maintenance," while more
liberal than the rule urged by Kent and Coke, shares a similar feature
with the other rules limiting maintenance in this Section, such as the
rule against intermeddling maintenance or malice maintenance. All of
these rules specify a fatal flaw in claims for civil redress which the
courts would otherwise accept and enforce. The rule of "desire but-for
maintenance" cites the absence of a genuine desire for redress as the
fatal flaw. The rule of intermeddling maintenance cites the absence of
genuine control as the fatal flaw. The rule of malice maintenance cites
the absence of a socially acceptable motive for seeking redress as a
fatal flaw.
In each case, while a story could be told (and sometimes is told)
about the utility of these rules in preventing frivolous lawsuits from
being brought, it is not at all obvious that these rules are the best way
to protect the courts from frivolous litigation, and this Article takes
the position that their robust survival in the modern era is explicable
only in terms of the conceptual and non-instrumental values these
rules reflect. The connection between them is the same as the
connection I drew between the non-consequentialist reasons that lay

235. Casserleigh I, 59 P. at 1026. This is assuming that the only way to secure Casserleigh's
cooperation was to promise him a contingent part of the recovery. Of course, if Casserleigh had
acted out of political or charitable motives, then the maintenance would not be champerty, but
selfless maintenance, which was discussed infra Section III.B.2.
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in common behind the common law's hostility to unlimited assignment
and its hostility to unlimited maintenance at the end of Part II. I
argued that the common law disfavored assignment and maintenance
because it permitted someone who had not suffered a wrong to
exercise an inappropriate degree of control over a claim for redress for
a private wrong suffered by a stranger. I referred to this conceptual
objection to assignment and maintenance as the theory of the
inauthentic claim.
We can see how the objections based on the theory of the
inauthentic claim in the law of assignment are repeated in the rule of
the law of maintenance reviewed in this Section. The chief argument
for the rules barring either variant of "but-for maintenance" is that a
lawsuit brought by a litigant who does not "genuinely" feel aggrieved
should not be brought at all. This is exactly the same argument made
by U.S. courts that refused to permit "naked" or 'bare" assignments.
These courts, it will be recalled, disfavored assigned lawsuits which
were corrupted by the original victim's indifference. The Nevada
Supreme court said that if the original victim of a civil wrong was "not
disposed to attempt the enforcement of' the suit, "he should not be
allowed to transfer his right to another party for the purpose of
prosecution." 236 In this argument, the U.S. courts were adopting the
principle developed by Lord Abinger in Prosser that "no
encouragement should be given to litigation, by the introduction of
parties to enforce those rights, which others are not disposed to
enforce."237
Now that the theory of the inauthentic claim has been
identified as pervasive in the common law's various rules for
regulating both assignment and maintenance, it is time to take up the
question of whether the theory of the inauthentic claim has any merit
independent of its deep historical roots in the common law.
IV. THE WEAK CASE FOR THE THEORY OF THE INAUTHENTIC CLAIM
In the preceding Part, I demonstrated that the law concerning
third-party investment in litigation has changed since the early
common law, and that this change, while generally in a direction of
liberalization, has been inconsistent. Islands of resistance to thirdparty investment exist, in different degrees, along at least two

236. Gruber v. Baker, 23 P. 858, 862 (Nev. 1890).
237. Prosser v. Edmonds, (1835) 160 Eng. Rep 196 (K.B.) 204; 1 Y. & C. Ex. 481, 497
(emphasis added).
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dimensions. First, there are islands of "no-assignment" in various
parts of the tort law, ranging from personal injury to fraud. Second,
there are islands of "no-maintenance" that constrain third-party
support in any form of civil litigation, ranging from the broadest
limitations (in Georgia and Illinois, for example, which forbid almost
all forms of maintenance by statute, or the District of Columbia, which
forbids it by common law) to the most liberal (New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Texas). The existence of these islands is no more
troubling in itself than the existence of islands of "no-duty" in the law
these kinds of
of liability for negligently caused personal injury;
238
law.
common
the
of
feature
inconsistencies are a
But as with tort law, when rules seem to be inconsistent across
areas of human behavior which seem indistinguishable from a social
or moral point of view, the common lawyer begins to feel
uncomfortable. While inconsistency may be unavoidable in the
has always fallen
common law, the burden to justify the inconsistency
239
on those who want to make it part of the law.
In Parts II and III of this Article, I argued that there has been
inconsistent treatment of third-party investment in litigation in the
common law. 240 The last time there was true consistency was at the
earliest centuries of the common law in England, when (or so we are
told) the assignment of all choses in action were prohibited, and no
form of maintenance, other than "selfless maintenance," was
permitted. In Part II, I detailed the various devices that led the
common law to recognize, in fits and starts, assignments in property,
then contract, then torts that did not involve "personal rights," then
proceeds of torts that did involve assignments of "personal rights,"
until finally the common law of the United States embraces free
assignability in all choses of action except personal injury (including

238. See, e.g., Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty" 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265,
319-23 (2006) (discussing the place of "no duty" rules in modern American negligence law); Gary
T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26
GA. L. REv. 601, 659-63 (1992).
239. It is worth recalling the words of Judge Kaufman, who fought for a clear rule barring
liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress independent of physical contact: 'To be sure,
the majority freely-one might say almost cheerfully-acknowledges that its position is
arbitrary; yet nowhere does it consider the cost of such institutionalized caprice." Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 882 (Cal. 1989). I agree with Kaufman that courts ought not to be engines
of "institutionalized caprice."
240. The history of inconsistencies noted in this Article has been drawing comment for some
time. See, e.g., Cnty. Hotel & Wine Co. v. London and N.W. Ry. Co., [1918] 2 K.B. 251 (Eng.);
BODKIN, supra note 37, at 9-10; Radin, supra note 20, at 78 (commenting on inconsistencies in
common law treatment of third-party investment in litigation).
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slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress), legal
malpractice (except when it does), and fraud (except when it does).
Part III detailed the history of the liberalization of the law of
maintenance in the common law. Based on the prohibitions
memorialized in the words of Kent and Coke, maintenance was
apparently prohibited except in cases involving what I called selfless
maintenance. Part III explained that the rule set out by Kent and
Coke, which I called material but-for maintenance, which would have
barred all forms of profit maintenance, was never embraced in the
United States. Furthermore, beginning with the adoption of a special
exception for what I called lawyer maintenance (the contingency fee)
in the early twentieth century, pockets of profit maintenance were
permitted. These increased under a variety of common law and
statutory rules, until we now have a situation where almost half of the
jurisdictions in the United States allow some form of profit
maintenance, and a few arguably have lifted all restrictions on
maintenance under their common law, to the point where even
antisocial forms of maintenance (malice maintenance) are treated as a
species of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, tortious
interference with economic advantage, or prima facie tort.
U.S. courts have never been shy about admitting that the
earliest justification for limitations on assignment and champerty has
almost no relevance to contemporary life. 241 As early as 1824, a New
York court observed that "the English doctrine of maintenance arose
from causes peculiar to the state of the society in which it was
established. 242 In this Article, I have taken these courts seriously, and
have proposed that a conceptual argument for resisting third-party
investment in litigation is at work; I have called this the theory of the
inauthentic claim. In this Part, I identify the two arguments for
maintaining the theory of the inauthentic claim as an independent
reason for rejecting further liberalization of the rules concerning
assignment and maintenance. The first is historical and the second is
jurisprudential. In my opinion both are quite weak, and cannot at this
moment offer a firm foundation for those who seek to limit third-party
investment in litigation.

241. See supra note 176 (explaining why South Dakota law deems maintenance prohibition
unnecessary).
242. Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 645 (N.Y. 1824).
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A. The HistoricalArgument

The historical argument against a market in lawsuit assumes
that the practices embedded in our common law and legal history
should be given some weight, especially in the face of calls for reform
(which this Article clearly is). According to modern critics of
maintenance, the idea that a lawsuit should be the object of thirdparty investment would have been unthinkable to our forebears. 243
The reason is not that the idea would not have occurred to them, but
that it would have offended certain basic assumptions of the early
common law and would have violated the law itself. According to
Stephen Presser, "litigation was something of an evil, and . . . [a]
litigious society was a fractured society. ' 244 According to Presser, this
changed when the "shame of litigation" (the traditional common law
view) was replaced by the "romance of litigation. '245 The success of the
civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s changed the centuriesold social prejudice against litigation; even garden-variety personal
injury litigation was now seen not as "a social evil but a form of
political expression and, in particular, an avenue for plaintiffs (the
'aggrieved') to learn of and to 'effectuate' 'legal rights.' "246 In 1964 the
American Bar Association noted that the view that "litigation, per se,
is bad has been replaced by the view that litigation is a socially useful
way to resolves disputes, particularly the injury claims arising from
247
our mechanized society."
Because litigation was an evil to be avoided, the common law
adopted multiple mechanisms to express its disapproval of those who
would excite unnecessary litigation, including strict bans on
maintenance. 248 Evidence of this is supposed to be found in the
writings of Blackstone. Blackstone defined "barretry [sic]" as "exciting
and stirring up [of law] suits." 249 Using the vocabulary developed in
Part III, we can see that Blackstone included in this category any

243. See, e.g., SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 3 (explaining that third-party litigation
financing was not allowed at common law); Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third
Party Litigation in Historicaland Ideological Perspective, (10th Annual Legal Reform Summit,
U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform Oct. 28, 2009).
244. Presser, supranote 221, at 4, 12.
245. Presser, supranote 243, at 5-9.
246. Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1990-97 (2004).
247. F. B. MACKINNON, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITY 210 (1964).

248. Presser, supra note 243, at 9-12.
249. BLACKSTONE, supranote 55, at* 133.
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third-party support except selfless maintenance, and even then only
25 0
when directed towards one's own family or a poor person.
Prohibited, apparently, was any act by a stranger with the foreseeable
consequence of causing another to bring a lawsuit, including, it seems,
merely proposing to another that they had an actionable claim. 251 One
could be guilty of "barretry" even if one encouraged only non-frivolous
claims. 252 Blackstone defined maintenance and champerty as
"bear[ing] a near relation" to "barretry"; these occurred when a
stranger did more than encourage litigation, but took the positive step
of assisting the suit by means of money or in-kind services (for
example, acting as the attorney). 25 3 It was an "offence against public
justice" to assist a stranger's suit, and according to Blackstone, even
the Romans made it a crime to "support another's lawsuit by money,
254
witnesses or patronage."
The historical story told by Presser might help support the
continued adoption of the theory of the inauthentic claim as a freestanding limitation on the laws regulating assignment and
maintenance. Arguments rooted in the history or "culture" of a legal
system must be handled carefully, but it would be extremely
formalistic and narrow-minded to say that the historical practices and
attitudes towards litigation do not matter at all when discussing the
continued vitality of a conceptual claim about litigation such as the
theory of the inauthentic claim. 255 It would be an argument in support
of the theory of the inauthentic claim if it were true that, as a
historical matter, the pursuit of legal rights was seen not as a good in
itself, and in fact that the pursuit of legal rights was seen as a
regrettable act to be done only as a last resort. This would support the
view, suggested by the quotes from Abinger, Kent, and Coke, that
courts should support only those suits which are "necessary." It would
also support the view suggested by cases like Gruber and Poe that it is
not a good thing, all considered, for a wrongdoer to be forced to
250. Id. at *134.
251. Id. at *135-36.
252. Id.; see also Radin, supra note 20, at 59-60 (explaining that even supporters of rightful
actions were presumed to be wrongful under Roman Law).
253. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *134.
254. Id.
255. Beliefs about legal concepts as well as other types of beliefs may play a role in guiding
choices about the structure of legal systems. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of
Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canadaand the United States, 25 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 499, 536 (1991) (hypothesizing that the differences between claiming rates in Canada
and the United States can be explained by differences in how each society conceptualizes
"adversary culture").
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confront his wrongdoing if the only way for that to occur is for a
stranger to become the "but-for" cause of the civil suit.
My objection to the historical argument is not that it is
historical, but that it is wrong as a matter of history. The
Blackstonian account suggests a straight line of hostility extending
from Rome until the late twentieth century, when U.S. courts
developed the views that litigation was no longer a social evil, and
anything short of fraud which promoted legitimate claiming was a
good thing. The historical truth is more complex, and offers almost no
support for the idea that Blackstone's views were accepted in the
United States. The Romans were much more comfortable with thirdparty involvement in litigation than medieval England, which was
very influenced by the "Christian attitude that litigation was
something to be discouraged," and by the time the American colonies
split from England, the laws of maintenance, which Radin called "the
last flaring up of feudalism," were already on the decline on both sides
256
of the Atlantic.
As Radin pointed out in his classic history of champerty and
maintenance, the idea that "litigation was itself something to be
discouraged, even if the claim was well-founded.., ran counter" to the
views of classical Roman law. 257 The prohibition on barratry, as
defined by Blackstone, was foreign to Roman law. 2 58 Roman law
criminalized calumnia (from which we get the word "calumny"), which
meant the support of fraudulent, groundless, or frivolous litigation for
profit. 259 In Rome, even "[the] maintenance of vexatious lawsuits for
profit" would not have been prohibited "because it was not clearly the
260
maintenance of a wrongful action."
Radin's theory as to why medieval English common law had
such a hostile attitude towards litigation, even non-frivolous litigation,
was twofold. First, litigiousness was "an indication of a quarrelsome
and un-Christian spirit."26 1 Second, since litigation which was not
absolutely necessary was most likely motivated by a desire for profit,
it would have been disfavored because "in medieval eyes [it] was

256. Radin, supranote 20, at 56-65.
257. Id. at 56.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 59.
260. Id. at 59-60.
261. Id. at 58 ("Vexatiousness, accordingly, consisted not merely in using legal procedures
unjustifiably, but in using them excessively, even when it was justified, or in using it all except
under the pressure of necessity. A man .. had no business to intermeddle with the interests or
wrongs of someone else.").
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tainted with that speculation which was the essence of the abhorred
sin of usury."262 These explanations offer very little support to the
historical argument in defense of the theory of the inauthentic claim.
Radin suspected that even in England by the time Blackstone and
Coke wrote, the role played by so-called Christian attitudes towards
litigation had become part of the "psychological background" with
which lawyers approached new and unfamiliar legal innovations, such
as the assignment of choses in action and the rise of an
entrepreneurial legal class. 263 Radin did not deny that the professed
hostility of some members of the legal profession to litigation and,
more specifically, third-party investment in litigation, was a genuine
reaction to changes in the economic order of the day. 264 Radin noted
that "in most instances, the modern objections to champerty are voiced
by the more successful members of the profession and on behalf of
'265
propertied defendants.
If Presser's argument is that an anti-litigation stance should be
embraced because it is rooted in a set of cultural, historical, and
economic assumptions that are pre-capitalist, it is a very strange
argument indeed. U.S. legal culture is not defined by an aversion to
speculation. It is easy, in fact, to see how neatly the economic
principles behind maintenance fit with the emerging capitalist United
States. As Morton Horwitz has demonstrated, early U.S. private law
was altered from its English roots precisely in order to promote the
power of individuals to invest their capital as they saw fit. 266 Even in
1936 Radin could see the connection between the United States'
commitment to private property and free markets and the
phenomenon of third-party involvement in litigation:
A claim in litigation is often as such a valuable piece of property ....To acquire a share
in such a claim is essentially a speculation and in the Middle Ages [was] tainted with
the discredit which attached to every form of speculation .... Speculation in the United

262. Id. at 59-61. Radin pointed out that the term "champerty" was derived from the concept
in property law of tenure by champart, which was a form of tenancy by which a landowner
shared ownership with the tenant and received a portion of the harvest, but took the risk that
there may be no return at all (the tenant, in turn, had an obligation to work the land or risk
forfeiture). Id. at 61-62. Radin argued that tenancy in champart was imported into the Statute
of Westminster II, which was the earliest legal prohibition of third party support of litigation, in
order to apply to a new context a familiar concept. Id. at 62.
263. Id. at 68.
264. Id. at 65 ("[The law prohibiting] champerty ... had its source in the resistance to the
slowly growing capitalism that followed the Renaissance...
265. Id. at 66.
266. See generallyMORTON J.HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1979).
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States never had the continuous history of slight moral obliquity which it retained in
267
England ....

B. The JurisprudentialArgument
Another argument for the theory of the inauthentic claim is
that it instantiates an essential feature of private law-corrective
justice-and therefore serves an architectonic function of guiding the
development of common law doctrines. 268 Given the diversity of views
within the collection of scholars who are associated with corrective
justice, any summary will necessarily be incomplete. 269 The core idea
if corrective justice is that:
[P]ersons owe certain primary duties not to cause certain kinds of injuries to others ....
The law responds to those breaches of primary duties that cause injuries to others by
generating secondary duties to repair the losses flowing from those breaches .... [The]
law, on this view, aims both to specify the primary duties actors owe to7 0one another and
2
to provide a vehicle by which the secondary duty to repair is enforced.

A connection between the theory of the inauthentic claim and
corrective justice could plausibly be located in the fact that the theory
of the inauthentic claim emphasizes what has been called the "bipolar"
feature of corrective justice.2 7 1 All private law litigation (not just tort,
which is the doctrinal subgenre with which corrective justice is
primarily concerned) is relational: claims are asserted by those
persons who have suffered a wrong for which the defendant is
responsible because of a legally significant relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant (the content of this relationship will vary with
the subgenre at issue-but duty and cause often figure in the
analysis). The theory of the inauthentic claim also relies on the
relational or bipolar nature of parties to justify its hostility to third-

267. Radin, supra note 20, at 69-70.
268. Benjamin Zipursky makes a plausible argument that this is the proper way to
understand the relationship between tort theory, for example, and tort law. See Benjamin C.
Zipursky, PragmaticConceptualism,6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 458-59 (2000).
269. Some of the major recent accounts of corrective justice include JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS
AND WRONGS (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1998);
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 449 (1992). Although not a corrective justice theory, civil recourse theory will be discussed
in this section. See Zipursky, supra note 88.
270. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570 (2003).
271. See Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2264 (1996) (reviewing
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)) (noting Weinrib's vision of the bipolar
structure of corrective justice).
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party involvement in litigation. In the case of assignment, the theory
of the inauthentic claim holds that a right to redress must be enforced
by the person who suffered the wrong for which redress is claimed. In
the case of maintenance, the theory of the inauthentic claim holds that
the enforcement of a right to redress must be the product of the
genuine desires of the party who suffered the wrong, where "genuine"
means either unaided or uninfluenced by a third party. In each case,
the defendant's obligation to repair must be invoked by the right
person for the right reasons. The question is whether the relational
requirements of corrective justice entail or require the relational
27 2
requirements of the theory of the inauthentic claim.
In the brief comments that follow, I will argue that there is no
necessary connection between most versions of corrective justice and
the theory of the inauthentic claim. The argument will proceed as
follows. First, I will test the proposition that there is a connection
against the theory of corrective justice currently offered by Jules
Coleman, the "mixed conception of corrective justice," and I will argue
that no connection exists. 273 I will take his account to be one of the
leading standard accounts of corrective justice, although of course I
recognize that his account differs significantly from other leading
theories, specifically Ernest Weinrib's. 274 Then, I will test the
proposition that there is an entailment between the theory of "civil
recourse" proposed by Ben Zipursky and the theory of the inauthentic
275
claim.
According to Coleman, "all viable accounts of corrective justice,
whatever their substantive disagreements, are committed to the

272. This question assumes that corrective justice theory is a plausible account of the private
law. If it were the case that the theory of the inauthentic claim was entailed by corrective justice
theory, and that corrective justice theory was invalid or failed to describe the common law, then
the entailment would be of merely academic interest. It would have no practical implications for
whether the current law of assignment and maintenance should be preserved or liberalized. But
given the importance of corrective justice theory to scholars in modern commonwealth
jurisdictions, it seems prudent to proceed under the assumption that an entailment between
corrective justice and the theory of the inauthentic claim would have practical significance.
273. COLEMAN, supra note 269; see also Stephen R. Perry, The Mixed Conception of
Corrective Justice, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 917, 917 (1992). The mixed conception is different
from Coleman's earlier account, the "annulment thesis," which he has abandoned. See Jules L.
Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349, 365 (1992).
274. Weinrib differs with Coleman in that his theory of corrective justice posits that the duty
of the defendant is to "annul wrongs" rather than "repair losses." Perry, supranote 273, at 921. I
agree with Perry that this leaves Weinrib vulnerable to far more objections than Coleman, hence
the emphasis on Coleman's approach. See Perry, supra note 269, at 479.
275. Zipursky, supra note 88, at 739.
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centrality of human agency, rectification, and correlativity. 276 Under
his account, the duty to repair wrongful losses "is grounded not in the
fact that they are the result of wrongdoing, but in the fact that the
losses are . .. the result of [the injurer's] agency." 277 The definition of
wrongful loss is contingent on the particular legal system of the
time. 278 As Stephen Perry points out, wrongfulness in private law need
not result from wrongdoing, in the sense of intentional or negligent
conduct. 279 This is especially important for establishing the relevance
of corrective justice theory to the theory of the inauthentic claim, since
the theory of the inauthentic claim, although often applied to lawsuits
in tort, should, in theory, apply to any chose in action, including
contract and property claims-claims in which wrongful loss are not
necessarily linked to wrongdoing. The key point for Coleman, however,
once the content of wrongfulness is established by the legal system, is
that "[c]orrective justice is a norm that links agents with wrongful
losses."

280

The question for our purposes is whether the requirement that
agents are connected to the wrongful losses they have caused entails
that they must rectify those losses through a direct relationship with
their victims, or a relationship that is generated only by their victims'
desire for rectification. That is, would it be enough if, after a victim
suffered a wrong, the wrongdoer's response was wholly in the control
of a third party, assuming of course, that the procedures by which the
third party sought recovery from the victim were at least as effective
as the procedures otherwise available to the victim (that is, her
personal pursuit of redress from the wrongdoer by means of a
lawsuit). This requires further inquiry into what Coleman once called
the "modes of recovery" in corrective justice. 28 1 Whereas he once
thought that corrective justice was indifferent to the modes of
recovery, once he rejected the annulment thesis he came to believe
that corrective justice imposes a minimum content on the modes of
recovery. Corrective justice is defined by its insistence on "agentrelative reason for acting."28 2 This is what he means by saying

276. Jules L. Coleman, The Practiceof Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 26 (1995).
277. COLEMAN, supra note 269, at 326.
278. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLy' 637, 646 (1992)
(arguing that "the status of corrective justice is not necessarily independent of legal or other
relevant social practices").
279. Perry, supranote 273, at 925.
280. Coleman, supra note 278, at 646.
281. Coleman, supra note 273, at 352.
282. Coleman, supra note 278, at 645.
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"corrective justice involves correlativity of some sort.... The claims of
corrective justice are limited or restricted to parties who bear some
28 3
normatively important relationship to one another."
Nothing in this account necessarily entails the theory of the
inauthentic claim. While corrective justice requires "correlativity of
some sort" it does not require mimetic correlativity. So, for example,
Coleman's requirements would certainly be met by maintenance
contracts that would fail the test of "material but-for maintenance"
(the test endorsed by Blackstone, Kent, and Coke). It is irrelevant to
Coleman's account why the defendant rectifies a wrongful loss, as long
as (a) the defendant in fact exercised her agency to cause the plaintiffs
harm and (b) the harm suffered by the plaintiff is a wrongful loss that
bears the right relationship to the defendant. 28 4 The fact that the
victim could not have pursued the correction of the wrongful loss, or,
for that matter, was indifferent as to whether the wrongful loss was
corrected until a third party changed his mind, is simply irrelevant.
Furthermore, it is irrelevant to Coleman's account that the
victim does not actually receive the remedy that is sought from the
defendant. Under both assignment and profit maintenance, the
plaintiff typically agrees to give up a portion of his recovery (the
remedy or a settlement) to a third party. The defendant's obligation to
rectify the wrongful loss is not altered in any way by this
agreement. 28 5 But what of the fact that in assignment the victim does
not receive anything at all from the defendant? How can the
requirement of correlativity of any sort be met in cases of assignment?
This objection, it seems to me, misunderstands what Coleman means
when he says that "because corrective justice imposes a duty to repair
on those individuals who have wronged or wrongfully injured others,
it has the effect of sustaining or protecting some underlying set of
norms." 28 6 The duty to repair, which is based on the wrongful loss
suffered by the victim, is a normative fact; it does not depend on
whether the wrongful loss is repaired. Of course, a system in which
283. Coleman, supra note 276, at 26.
284. See Perry, supra note 273, at 926 (describing the agency and wrongfulness
requirements).
285. It should be noted that, even if the law of assignment and maintenance did somehow
effect a reduction of the defendant's duty to correct a wrongful loss, even this would not
necessarily prove a conflict between Coleman's theory and the practices of assignment and
maintenance. Corrective justice may be a conceptual essential of the private law, but it can be
modified or even suspended. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 276, at 29 ('whereas corrective
justice is both pre-political and non-instrumental, legal and political practices can affect the
content of the duty corrective justice gives rise to in many ways.").
286. Coleman, supranote 278, at 645.
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wrongful losses were never repaired-that is, the defendant fails to
provide the remedy to the victim-would be a system which did not
instantiate corrective justice. 28 7 But that is not the situation of the
common law with full rights of assignment. The victim's right to
assign her right to redress does not destroy the defendant's duty to
make repair to her, even if the remedy does not go to her, any more
than the fact that a victim may no longer be alive, and may be
represented by an estate in a survivorship action alters the
defendant's duty in corrective justice to repair the wrongful loss he
caused. Duty to repair in tort law must be, as a matter of necessity (if
for no other reason that sometimes victims are killed by the
wrongdoer), agent-relative in a special way: the reason why the
wrongdoer is obliged to repair (and the amount he is obliged to pay in
repair) was fixed when the injury was caused to the victim, and if the
repair is secured by someone else, either because of the operation of
law (as is the case in a survivorship action) or contract (as in the case
of assignment), the normative fact that grounds the obligation to
repair remains rooted in the victim's right to repair.
The critic of assignment and maintenance could retreat from
corrective justice in the conventional form offered by Coleman, and
argue that according to other, equally persuasive variants, the
relational requirement of corrective justice is inconsistent with
assignment and maintenance. I am thinking in particular of
Zipursky's "civil recourse theory," which breaks with corrective justice
at a point which is relevant to this discussion.
Zipursky has criticized corrective justice for misunderstanding
the content of the defendant's duty in private law. 28 8 He argues that
corrective justice
wrongly presupposes that the imposition of liability reflects a judgment, embedded in
the law, that defendants ought to bear the costs of certain injuries. This assumption
misconstrues what the state actually does in private causes of action . . . . In an
important sense, the state does not judge that certain defendants ought to pay certain
a plaintiffs demand that
amounts to plaintiffs. Rather, the state accedes to, and enforces,
289
the state compel defendant to pay her a certain amount.

287. Id. at 646 (discussing New Zealand's no fault scheme: "[W]hen such a plan is in effect
there are no duties in corrective justice.").
288. See Zipursky, supra note 88, at 718-21 (noting that unlike contractual and property
law, tort law does not contain an "affirmative duty to pay"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights,
Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (arguing that proponents
of corrective justice generally neglect "substantive standing' in tort law).
289. Zipursky, supra note 288, at 80.
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Zipursky argues that there is no "freestanding legal obligation"
to repair wrongful losses in the common law: "a defendant's tortious
injury to another does not give rise to a duty of repair unless that
defendant has, at a minimum, been sued." 290 Zipursky's complaint
with corrective justice is not great-he himself admits that he thinks
Coleman and others "rearranged the genuine structure of tort law" but
got the basic elements right.29 1 His innovation is to recognize that the
private law does not create a duty to repair on the part of the
defendant but a right of action against the defendant. 292 This is the
basis of his principle of civil recourse.
Does civil recourse theory make assignment less compatible
with our common law? On the one hand, one could argue that, since
the norm instantiated by civil recourse theory makes the plaintiffs
right to bring a cause of action correlative with her wrongful loss, the
private law remedy must take the form of the plaintiff bringing the
suit. Under this account, redress in private law must be mimetic to
the extent that the original relationship that gave rise to the right (A
violated n's right) structures the remedy (n has right of action against
A). 293 That some plaintiffs choose not to enforce their rights to civil
redress may pose a greater challenge for assignment under civil
recourse theory than under corrective justice, where the failure of
plaintiffs to receive the full measure of the repair they are owed does
not undermine the normative fact that the defendants in fact owe
them a duty to repair.
As with corrective justice, I think it is a mistake to insist that
redress in private law must mirror the relationship that gave rise to
the wrong. Zipursky may be correct that private law-especially with
its unique feature of substantive standing--changes the character of
the normative relationship between victim and defendant, such that
the significant normative fact is the power the victim gains over the
defendant to pursue redress. 294 However, it is not clear why this
means that the right created by the wrongdoing must be satisfied by

290. Zipursky, supra note 88,at 720.
291. Id. at 735.
292. Id.
293. One could hold this position despite the existence of survivorship actions. The argument
made earlier was an interpretive one; obviously it is open to the civil justice theorist to argue, if
they insisted on the sort of mimetic relationship now under consideration, that survivorship is a
second-best solution in the face of the plaintiffs inability to bring suit, where the alternative (the
defendant paying no one) is unacceptable.
294. See Zipursky, supra note 88, at 714-15 (describing the "substantive standing" rule and
its importance in tort law).
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the wrongdoer providing redress only to the person she wronged. The
right to seek redress was a product of the wrongdoing, and it is not
clear why the rightholder cannot do what she wants with that rightdestroy it, ignore it, or give it to someone else. The normative fact that
gave rise to the right will not be undermined, and it is not clear why
the courts should not respect the sovereignty of the rightholder to
exercise unlimited control over that right.
V. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON POLICY

The purpose of this Article is to isolate an argument against
assignment and maintenance. This argument, which I have called the
theory of the inauthentic claim, may have once had some independent
normative force, but as I have demonstrated, it is not currently
persuasive from either a historical or jurisprudential perspective. This
Article has also demonstrated that the doctrinal development of the
law has been twisted and rendered incoherent by the theory of the
inauthentic claim in two specific ways. The law of assignment has
been permitted to expand by means of legal fictions that hide its true
structure and purpose, while the law of maintenance has not been
permitted to expand as much as it could.
While the purpose of this Article has been to criticize the
theory of the inauthentic claim and to map out its baleful influence in
our law, the Article clearly has taken a further position on the
desirability of liberal rules concerning assignment and maintenance.
This Article has not evaluated the positive case for the utility of a
market in lawsuits for two reasons. First, because others have already
begun this work. 295 Second, because it seems to me that, once one
understands the role that has been played by the theory of the
295. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697
(2005); Bond, supra note 162; Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort
Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435 (1995); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383 (1989); Dobner, supra note 191; Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in
Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009) [hereinafter Molot, Litigation Risk]; Painter, supra
note 48; Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?, 36
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515 (1998); Shukaitis, supra note 54; Jonathan T. Molot, A Market Approach
to Litigation Accuracy (10th Annual Legal Reform Summit, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal
Reform, Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Molot, Market Approach]; Rubin, supra note 34; Max
Schanzenbach & David Dana, How Would Third Party FinancingChange the Face of American
Tort Litigation?: The Role of Agency Costs in the Attorney-Client Relationship (Third Party
Financing of Litigation Roundtable, Searle Ctr., Nw. Univ. Law Sch., Sept. 24-25, 2009),
availableat http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploads/DanaSchanzenbachAgency
%20Costsl.pdf; David Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: The Effect of Litigation
Funding on Legal Outcomes (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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unauthentic claim in the history of the common law so far, it is not
clear why the burden of proof is on those who want to lift limits on
assignment and maintenance, rather than on those who insist that the
courts should preserve common-law precedents that are based on
arbitrary reasons and historical myth.
It would be foolish to pretend that considerations of policy have
not always been in the background when the limits of assignment and
champerty were debated and chosen. The Roman rule of calumnia was
justified by the desire to prevent false and harassing litigation. 296 The
early common law prohibitions on assignment, which were stricter
than the Roman law, were later similarly justified as being designed
to prevent false and harassing litigation. 297 Even Blackstone offered
up what can be described as "policy" arguments for opposing
champerty. 298 But it is not enough to say that policy arguments should
play a role in the evaluation of legal rules such as assignment and
maintenance. The framing of two further questions is critical to
insuring that the policy inquiry provides a useful result. The first
question is, what concerns should matter when evaluating the laws of
assignment and maintenance? The second question is, assuming that
we care mostly about the effect of the laws of assignment and
maintenance on the functioning of the civil litigation system, what
effects are to be avoided?
A. What Concerns Should Matter?
To invoke the policy that "a lawsuit is an evil in itself," as some
have done, is not really to put forward a policy argument, unless that
policy is, as Radin put it, that it is "always better to suffer a wrong
than to redress it by litigation."29 9 But that is not to say that there is
not a diverse range of policy concerns that are motivated by political
and social concerns that stand on a different footing than the
historical and jurisprudential arguments reviewed in Part IV.

296. Radin, supra note 20, at 52-53, 56.
297. See Damian Reichel, Note, The Law of Maintenanceand Champerty and the Assignment
of Choses in Action, 10 SYDNEY L. REV. 166, 166 (1983) (noting that in medieval times "[b]arons
abused the law to their own ends and... [b]ribery, corruption, and intimidation of judges and
justices of the peace [was] widespread').
298. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *135 (' This is an offence against public justice... [that]
perverts the remedial process of law into an engine of oppression.").
299. See Radin, supra note 20, at 72. Radin suspected that those who still held onto the
assumption of Medieval society, that a law suit is an evil in itself' suffered from an "infantile
psychosis" that insisted on an "all or nothing" approach to legal rules. Id.

2011]

THE INAUTHENTIC CLAIM

One of these policy concerns has to do with the effect of profit
maintenance on the relationship between litigants and their
lawyers. 30 0 The Ohio Supreme Court identified one of the potential
problems in the Rancman case, discussed in Section III.B. 30 1 A
contract with a third-party funder may make it very difficult for the
litigant to accept a settlement offer that her attorney recommends.
Another potential problem arises from the question of waiver of
privilege with regard to attorney-client communications and work
product. 302 A third-party funder may want to form an independent
valuation of a case based on an examination of materials that are
privileged. The litigant may not appreciate the costs associated with
waiving privilege, especially when weighed against the risk of losing
the desired funding if the materials are not provided. Furthermore,
the litigant's lawyer may not be able to give the client a clear answer
whether under these circumstances she is in fact waiving privilege at
all. The uncertainty surrounding this question is quite real, as
numerous opinions from bar committees around the country have
3 03
demonstrated.
This Article cannot provide a solution to these concerns, but it
can help place them in context. Obviously, rather than assume that all
maintenance agreements interfere with the relationship between
lawyers and litigants, and that a presumption against them should be
built into the law, I would recommend that bar associations and other
concerned parties develop solutions that preserve the right of litigants
to communicate with third-party funders without necessarily
destroying privileges they would otherwise enjoy.
Another policy concern is whether the laws of assignment and
maintenance should discriminate on the basis of the subject of
litigation. This was discussed briefly in Section III.B.4.a. This is not
the same question as asking whether malice maintenance ought to be
prohibited, since, as I argued above, malice maintenance is already
prohibited by common law doctrines that are not specific to

300. See SELLING LAWSUITS, supranote 3, at 7-8.
301. See Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220-21 (Ohio
2003). See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
302. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b) (stating that an inadvertent disclosure may act as a waiver of
privilege if the sending attorney did not take "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure").
303. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on the Rules of Profl Conduct, Op. 01-07 (2001); Fla. Bar
Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Op. 00-3 (2002); State Bar of Mich., Standing Comm. on Profl and
Judicial Ethics, RI-321 (2000); N.J. Advisory Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 691 (2001); Supreme
Court of Tex., Profl Ethics Comm., Op. 558 (2005); see also Hananel & Staubitz, supranote 187.
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maintenance. 3 4 It is similar to the exceptions to the so-called rule of
free assignability discussed in Part II. The difference is that I argued
that many of the subject-based exceptions to the rule of free
assignability make no sense, such as the continuing prohibition on the
assignment of actions for personal injury (but not the proceeds of
personal injury) or legal malpractice (but not interference with
prospective economic advantage) or fraud (only in some jurisdictions).
It may be the case that good arguments can be made for why
certain causes of action should not be assignable or should not be the
subject of maintenance contracts based on either a general theory of
noncommodification or more local concerns specific to the effects of
allowing third-party investment on third parties. This Article cannot
begin to sketch out the kinds of arguments that might prove
persuasive, but I will note that scholars including Margaret Radin and
others have been discussing when and under what circumstances the
30 5
law should permit commodification.
The following news story reflects the difficulties with picking
which subjects can be the object of investment. The British press
reported in 2009 that Harbour Litigation Funding, based in London,
was "investing" in the divorce suit of Michelle Young against her
estranged husband, Scot Young, whose fortune was once valued at
more than £400 million. 30 6 The media coverage reflected unease over
bringing emotionally fraught disputes within the control of business
entities that have no interest or empathy with the parties (as one
funder said of the parties in divorce cases, "they tend to be
economically irrational and commercially irresponsible"). 30 7 On the
other hand, the article noted that the Young divorce was "about asset
recovery and has the same elements as a commercial dispute," and it
also noted that litigation funders could be serving a useful social
function in the U.K., where, due to high legal costs, unhappily married

304. See supraSection III.B.3.
305. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); see also MARTHA ERTMAN & JOAN
C. WILLIAMS, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE

(2005).
306. Jane Croft & Megan Murphy, Litigation Fund Backs £400m Divorce Case, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/97f1005e-b50f-llde-8b17-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp-rss.
307. Elena Moya, Hedge Funds, Investors and Divorce Lawyers - It's Match Made in Heaven,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 16, 2009, at 35, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009
/oct/16/hedge-funds-divorce-litigation-funding.
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parties "thought twice before considering divorce because of potential
30 8
deflation of the value of the family wealth."
It is obvious that divorce is an area of law where the rights are
truly personal in a way that has no parallel in contract law, or even,
for that matter, tort law. It would be unthinkable, for example, to
extend the logic of the Young investment by Harbour Litigation
Funding from profit maintenance to assignment. It is possible that
similar reasons would counsel limiting the maintenance contract
along certain dimensions. For example, even if a legal system were to
permit profit maintenance contracts in divorce, it might want to adopt
stricter rules concerning investor intermeddling than in lawsuits
309
concerning contracts or even personal injury.
B. What Effects Are To Be Avoided?
Most of the current policy-oriented work on the social effects of
third-party involvement in litigation is about profit maintenance, and
it divides into two groups. The majority of research is formal and
speculative-it uses models drawn from the contemporary literature of
law and economics to predict the likely effects of changing the current
310
bias against champerty to permit more investment in litigation.
There is a smaller set of studies that attempt to draw conclusions
about the effect of changing the law of maintenance in the United

308. Id. The article also notes that litigation funding came to the U.K. from continental
Europe. Allianz Litigation Funding UK, which is part of the German insurance group Allianz,
has already funded divorces in Germany and Switzerland. Id.
309. See supra Section LII.B.4(b). One might want to strictly limit the ability of a funder to
have veto power over the terms of the divorce settlement, for example, where one might permit a
funder to have some control over the terms of a settlement of a contract case.
310. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 295, at 702 (expressing skepticism about the overall
economic benefit of allowing alienation because adverse selection would lead to only problematic
claims being alienated); Choharis, supra note 295, at 444 ("The economic efficiencies resulting
from a tort claims market will benefit nearly every participant in the tort process."); Dobner,
supra note 191, at 1529 (describing the economic efficiency benefits of allowing claim alienation);
Molot, Litigation Risk, supra note 295, at 438 (addressing the feasibility of developing a market
in litigation risk and arguing its benefits); Painter, supra note 48, at 687 (arguing for the
abolition of champerty doctrines so that plaintiffs can better insure against legal cost); Rubin,
supra note 34, at 3 (arguing that allowing claim alienation would produce negative externalities,
namely increasing the amount and cost of litigation and moving the law in inefficient directions);
Schanzenbach & Dana, supra note 295, at 4 (arguing that claim alienation might reduce
attorney-client agency costs, as well as reduce negotiation and settlement costs and make
alternative dispute resolution more common); Shukaitis, supra note 54, at 330 (arguing that the
benefits of allowing claim alienation would substantially outweigh its costs); Molot, Market
Approach, supra note 295 (arguing that investment in litigation on both plaintiff and defendant
sides could promote more accurate settlements and lower total transaction costs).
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States from looking at the experiences of other nations where the law
311
of maintenance has been liberalized.
Most of the formal studies predict that the introduction of
champerty will have mostly positive effects on the civil litigation
system. They differ, however, on the nature of these beneficial effects.
Peter Choharis, for example, stresses the improvement of access to
31 2
justice for victims of tortious injury, especially medical malpractice.
Jon Molot stresses the increase in accuracy for the value of
settlements that would result from increasing the flow of capital to
litigants on both the defense and the plaintiff side of litigation.3 13 In
general, no one who favors increasing the freedom of parties to invest
in litigation argues that it will result in less litigation, although one
could imagine such an argument being made if one adopted Molot's
argument to the point of predicting that increases in litigation
resources will lead parties to settle sooner. Only Paul Rubin's study
takes a contrary view; he argues that increases in litigation funding
will be bad for the civil litigation system because it introduce "excess
lawsuits" into the system. 314 His argument is based in part on the
assumption that funders, having exhausted non-frivolous cases, will
315
have an incentive to encourage frivolous cases.
The two empirical studies that have so far been produced go
only part way to supporting the negative case offered by Rubin. Both
claim that after the liberalization of the laws restricting profit
maintenance in Australia, litigation rates increased. 31 6 The study by
Abrams and Chen cautions that no conclusions can be drawn from
their results about the transferability or desirability of the Australian
approach. 317 The study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is much less
cautious, and it recommends that "third-party litigation financing be
'31 8
prohibited in the United States.

311. See, e.g., SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 3, at 9 (examining third-party litigation
funding in Australia to warn that it can lead to an increased volume of litigation); Abrams &
Chen, supra note 295. Both of these studies rely exclusively on Australian data.
312. Choharis, supra note 295, at 473.
313. Molot, Litigation Risk, supra note 295, at 382; Molot, Market Approach, supra note 295.
314. Rubin, supra note 34, at 10-12.
315. Id. at 13-14.
316. SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 3 at 9; Abrams & Chen, supra note 295, at 19 ("Mhe
effect appears to be driven by the fact that lawsuits filed are declining in states without litigation
funding as funding amount increases, whereas lawsuits filed are increasing in states with
litigation funding as funding increases.").
317. Abrams & Chen, supra note 295, at 24-25.
318. SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 3, at 2. It should be noted that this study discusses only
the effect of changes in Australian law relating to third-party investment in class actions. The
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This brief survey of the state of current policy-oriented
research on the effects of changes in the law of maintenance in the
United States illustrates how far we have to go before we can rely on
policy arguments to evaluate the doctrinal confusion caused by the
theory of the inauthentic claim. It might be the case that there are
good policy-based reasons to liberalize the current law, but first we
have to define which policy ends we think count as significant in
making that decision. It might be the case that the civil justice system
will be affected by the introduction of third-party funding in litigation,
but it is not clear whether that effect will be primarily expressed in
terms of an increase in access to justice, accuracy in litigation
outcomes, or frivolous cases. Finally, it may be the case that we can
predict policy implications from looking at the experiences of other
nations who have liberalized their laws concerning third-party
involvement in litigation, but we should look beyond the experience of
one nation (Australia) and adopt a more nuanced examination of all
the nations that have permitted some form of third-party involvement
in litigation (especially in Europe).
The goal of this Article has been to establish the premise for
beginning the hard work of identifying reliable rationales for thirdparty involvement in litigation, whether as investors or as purchasers.
We already allow this to occur; what we need now is to explain to
ourselves why we allow it to occur-or do not, as the case may be-in
terms that do not rely on ad hoc judgments about the nature of the
common law. We are long overdue accepting what Radin said in 1936:
"There is no necessary and inevitable connection between improper
litigation, hard bargains and solicitation on the one hand and the
acquisition by a third party of an interest in a litigated case, on the
other."

319

law in Australia governing "group litigation" is different in many ways from American class
action law, specifically in the area of whether class representatives or their lawyers have the
power to promise a third party a contingent portion of the class action recovery. In Australia the
class representatives and their lawyers apparently have this power. See Campbells Cash &
Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 C.L.R. 386 (Austl.) (allowing a litigation funder to
continue appeals as part of representative proceeding). I believe that no American class
representative or her lawyer has this power.
319. Radin, supra note 20, at 72.
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Dan Simon
A fundamental function of the criminal trial is to determine
the facts correctly in order to distinguish between guilty and
innocent defendants, and between strong and weak prosecutions.
This Article seeks to answer a simple question: How good is the
criminal trial at reaching accurate factual conclusions?
The Article applies a body of experimental psychology to
examine the ability of factfinders to assess the evidence and draw
correct inferences from it. The psychological research indicates that
the mental processes involved in determiningfacts in criminal trials
are more complex and fickle than generally believed. Part I exposes
the difficulties in deciphering the human testimony that is
frequently encountered in criminal trials, including eyewitness
identification, witness memory for the event, confessions, alibis, and
witness demeanor. The task is further hindered by two systemic
problems with the integrity of the evidence: false corroborationand
the paucity of the investigative record. Part II demonstrates that the
inference-making process is susceptible to distortion from the context
of legal decisionmaking. Intrusive factors include courtroom
persuasion, exposure to impermissible information, emotional
arousal, racialprejudice, and the decisionmaker's cognitive process
itself.
In sum, the accuracy of the criminal trial falls short of the
system's high epistemic demands and the certitude it exudes. The
findings contribute to our understandingof the causes of mistaken
verdicts, particularly wrongful convictions. The Article proposes
ways to improve the diagnosticityof the process.

